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I. Introduction
Entrapment is as old as a pleasant garden, a forbidden fruit, and a 
fallen angel.  “The serpent beguiled me, and I did eat,” pleaded Eve in 
response to an accusing Lord God.1  Early English cases report 
instances of citizens being lured into crime so they might be 
apprehended.2  Nineteenth century American cases similarly record 
examples of persons tempted to illegality for the purpose of subjecting 
them to criminal sanctions.3  Entrapment as a social occurrence has 
long been with us.
In contrast, entrapment as a legal defense is of relatively recent 
mint.  Under the defense, a person may not be convicted of a crime if 
he has been encouraged to commit it by a government agent under the 
appropriate circumstances.  The doctrine’s genesis is generally traced 
to a series of United States Supreme Court opinions starting in the 
1930s.4  These opinions broke with the traditional view that it was 
legally irrelevant how the criminal was led to temptation.5  Following 
1 Genesis 3:13 (King James).
2 See Regina v.  Holden, 127 Eng.  Rep.  1107 (Cr.  Cas.  Res.  1810) (bank 
agents solicit defendants to purchase forged notes); Regina v.  Titley, Cox Crim.  Cas.  
526, 12 J.P  776 (Cent. Crim. 1848) (undercover police officer convinces chemist to 
sell aborticide); Regina v.  Bickley, 2 Crim. App. R. 53, 73 J.P. 239 (C.C.A. 1909) 
(same).
3 See People v. Mills, 70 N.E. 786 (1904) (undercover police officer provides 
indictments for defendant to steal); Board of Commissioners v.  Backus, 29 How.  Pr.  
33 (NY Sup.  Ct.  1864) (defendant sells liquor without licence to police agents and 
then is sued for penalty); President of the Town of St. Charles v. O’Mailey, 18 Ill 407 
(1857) (same). 
4 See Sorrels v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932); United States v. Russell, 411 
U.S. 423 (1937); Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 435 (1958).  Cf. Casey v. United 
States, 276 U.S. 413, 421-25 (1928) (Brandeis, J. dissenting; willing to recognized 
defense).  These cases, of course, were not without harbingers.  In the 1920s, lower 
courts had occasionally grasped and applied the underlying principles of entrapment 
as a defense.  See Rebecca Roiphe, The Serpent Beguiled Me: A History of the 
Entrapment Defense, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 257, 278-85 (2003); see also Michael 
A. DeFeo, Entrapment as a Defense to Criminal Responsibility: Its History, Theory 
and Application, 1 U. SAN. FRAN. L. REV. 243, 248 (1967) (identifying Saunders v. 
People, 38 Mich. 218 (1878), as earlier United States entrapment case).  Nevertheless, 
the United States Supreme Court, in the decisions cited above, stamped it with an 
unassailable seal of approval and put the defense on the national map.
5 See Roiphe, supra note 4 at 270 (“No state or federal court recognized 
entrapment as a valid defense prior to 1870.”); WAYNE LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW, 450 
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the Supreme Court’s lead, virtually every jurisdiction in the United 
States has adopted a version of the defense.6  Based on its brief history 
and wide reception, entrapment has strong claim to being the newest 
inductee into the criminal law’s pantheon of defenses.7
The fact that entrapment was for so long unrecognized as grounds 
for exoneration suggests that its rationale is not obvious.  Indeed, a 
moment’s consideration reveals the defense to be positively perplexing.  
Consider these scenarios:
Jacob is a 56-year-old farmer.  He orders by 
mail a magazine of photographs of nude boys at 
a time when such materials could by legally 
ordered.  Subsequently, over a two-and-a-half 
year period, he receives unsolicited mailing 
from five organizations such as “The American 
Hedonist Society,” which purport to oppose 
censorship of pornography and support sexual 
freedom.  Although Jacob does not place an 
order for child pornography with one such 
organization that contacts him through the mail, 
through a second he orders a magazine entitled 
(2000 3d. ed.)  (“[A]s a historical matter, the traditional response of the law was that 
there were no limits upon the degree of temptation to which law enforcement officers 
and their agents could subject those under investigation.”).   To this day, the defense 
of entrapment is generally not recognized in England.  See PAUL MARCUS, THE 
ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE 2 (1995 2d ed.).
6 See MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.13 cmt. at 407  (Official 
Draft and Revised Comments 1985) (“[T]he defense of entrapment has been almost 
universally recognized in the United States.”).  Twenty-five states have adopted 
entrapment statutes.  See MARCUS, supra note 5, ch. 12 (listing statutes).  The 
remaining states and the federal system have judicially-created entrapment defenses.
7 Though widely discussed, the battered woman syndrome defense is not well-
established.  While expert testimony concerning the psychological aspects of abusive 
relationships is usually admissible, see Bechtel v.  State, 840 P.2d 1 (Oak. Crim.  App. 
1992) (collecting cases from other jurisdictions), it is not clear that battered woman 
syndrome is properly described as a “new” defense.  Some suggest it is best 
conceived of as a subcategory of self-defense, see Alafair S. Burke, Rational Actors, 
Self-Defense, and Duress: Making Sense, Not Syndromes, Out of the Battered 
Woman, 81 N. CARO. L. REV. 207 (2002), and others suggest it is best conceived of a 
subcategory of duress, see Laurie Kratky Dore, Downward Adjustment and the 
Slippery Slope: The Use of Duress in the Defense of Battered Offenders, 56 OHIO ST. 
L. J. 665 (1995).
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“Boys Who Love Boys.”  Jacob is subsequently 
arrested for possessing sexually explicit 
depictions of children.
Ken is desperately in need of money.  He 
approaches Rocky for a loan.  Rocky refuses, 
but convinces Ken, who has no history of drug 
use, to join a drug transaction.  Ken and Rocky 
drive to a highway intersection where they meet 
Willy.  Willy gives Ken $300.  Willy and Ken 
agree to meet later that day to complete the 
transaction.  Ken reluctantly accepts a bag 
containing three grams of cocaine from Rocky.  
Rocky, Ken and Willy later meet in a parking 
lot.  When Ken gives Willy the bag, he is 
arrested and charged with dealing in cocaine.
Rich runs an ongoing yard sale.  One day at 
the yard sale, he is approached by Dale.  Dale 
offers him $200 worth of food stamps for an 
electric typewriter.  When Rich declines, Dale 
asks him if he would be interested in purchasing 
the food stamps.  Rich, who enjoys bartering, 
offers Dale $30, and they shortly agree on $35.  
Next month, Rich is again approached by Dale, 
and Rich agrees to buy $870 worth of food 
stamps for $140.  Rich is charged with 
unauthorized use of food stamps.
On these facts, Jacob, Ken and Rich will almost certainly be guilty as 
charged and face significant periods of incarceration.  Indeed, their 
cases might be considered all too common examples of how persons 
come to step over the line into illegality and become first-time 
offenders.  Now, however, add the facts that (1) the organizations that 
contacted Jacob were fictitious ones created by a unit within the Postal 
Service; (2) Rocky is an informant and Willy is an undercover police 
officer, and (3) Dale is an undercover police officer.  With these 
additional facts, Jacob, Ken, and Rich will very likely be able to 
establish the entrapment defense and avoid all liability.8
8 The three entrapment scenarios presented above are based on Jacobson v. 
United States, 112 S. Ct. 1535 (1992); Kats v.  Indiana, 559 N.E.2d 348 (Ct.  Apps.  
Ind. 1990), and People v.  Boalbey, 493 N.E.2d 369 (App.  Ct.  Ill.  1986), 
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Why should Jacob, Ken and Rich now escape criminal sanctions?  
As a doctrinal matter, the government’s role in the crimes, either as 
instigator or tempter, is the critical element triggering the operation of 
the defense.  In order for a defendant to establish the entrapment 
defense, a government agent must be the tempter or inducer.9  This fact, 
however, appears to have no bearing on the personal blameworthiness 
of Jacob, Ken and Rich.   After all, as far as they knew, they were 
dealing with private citizens.  Subjectively they appear to share the 
same culpable states of mind as their hypothetical counterparts who 
correctly believed they were dealing with private citizens and who 
would be convicted.  In both the actual and hypothetical cases, the 
temptations should have been resisted.  Likewise, it appears that Jacob, 
Ken, and Rich are no less dangerous to society by virtue of the 
government’s role in their crimes.  Their dispositions to crime are 
equally well confirmed regardless of whether those they are interacting 
with are employed by the government or are private citizens.  Since 
punishment is generally considered appropriate for those who have 
manifested their dangerousness through blameworthy conduct 
prohibited the criminal law, it seems equally appropriate for Steve, Ken 
and Rich.  Finally, some police activities that arguably crime control 
are objectionable on public policy grounds.  For example, 
unconstitutional searches and seizures,10 even if morally 
unobjectionable when used against criminals,11 are never permitted 
because they carry an unacceptable risk of being used against citizens 
who can rightly object to them.  However, it is unclear on what basis 
other citizens could object to the type of actions employed against 
Jacob, Ken, and Rich, as persons should be able to resist the 
respectively.  In all three cases, entrapment was found to be established as a matter of 
law.  Entrapment as a matter of law is a very demanding standard, appropriate only
where the existence of entrapment is indisputable.  The scenarios above, 
consequently, represent clear cases of entrapment.
9 See MARCUS, THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE, supra note 5, §§ 4.02 & 5.10.  A 
more detailed statement of the requirements of the entrapment defense is presented in 
Part II, infra.
10 See U.S. CONST.  AMEND.  IV.
11 Persons, it might be argued, as a matter of morality forfeit rights to privacy and 
liberty upon engaging in culpable illegal conduct.  This fact appears dimly recognized 
in the constitutional doctrine that a person has no legitimate privacy interest in the 
nondisclosure of illegal activity.  See United States v.  Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 122-
24 (1984) (holding use of field test to identify substance as cocaine not a search).
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temptations offered in those cases.  Why then permit the plea of 
entrapment?
Entrapment has been described as a defense “buffeted by 
conflicting interpretations.”12  This Article attempts to advance a new 
and superior interpretation by focusing on the relevancy of the 
entrapper’s governmental status.  First, the article presents the basic 
contours of the doctrine.  Second, it reviews a variety of theories of 
entrapment and exposes their shortcomings as explanations for why the 
entrapped should be exonerated.  Third, the Article introduces and 
defends a new theory of entrapment–entrapment as unfairness.  
According to this theory, entrapment is neither an excuse, a 
justification, nor a public policy defense, as those categories have 
traditionally been understood. Rather, entrapment is fatally unfair to its 
target in the following sense: For society to impose criminal sanctions 
on an entrapped person would be to place on her a disproportionate 
share of the cost of general crime prevention and control, violating the 
well-established norm of distributive justice that, to the extent possible, 
the cost of an activity should be shared among all its beneficiaries.
After elaborating this thesis, the Article considers and responds to a 
number of potential objections to entrapment as unfairness.  Finally, the 
Article applies the theory to a number of current controversies 
concerning entrapment.
II. The Law of Entrapment
Any exposition of the law of entrapment must begin with the fact 
that the doctrine has two versions.  The first version is the subjective 
version; the second is the objective version.  As discussed below, 
although they are distinct in structure and content, they overlap 
significantly in application.
A.  Basics of the Subjective Version
The subjective version of the entrapment defense is followed in 
the federal courts and in a substantial majority of the states.13
Commonly it is judicially created and lacks a statutory formulation.14
12 GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 542 (1978).
13 In Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540 (1992), the Supreme Court 
reaffirmed its commitment to the subjective approach.  Id. at 548-49.  Most states 
have adopted the subjective approach.  See MODEL PENAL CODE AND 
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 The subjective version of the defense has a two-part structure.  In 
most courts employing the subjective version, a defendant wishing to 
assert entrapment must first establish by a preponderance of the 
evidence that a government agent “induced” him to commit the crime 
he is charged with.15  If he is unsuccessful, the defense fails.  If the 
defendant is successful in carrying this burden, the burden shifts to the 
government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was 
“predisposed” to commit the crime.16  If the government carries its 
burden, demonstrating predisposition, the defense fails.  However, if at 
this point the government fails to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the induced defendant was predisposed, the defense succeeds and the 
defendant is acquitted on the ground of entrapment.
 In practice, it is relatively easy for the defendant to satisfy the 
first part of the test.  “Inducement” has been defined expansively as 
“soliciting, proposing, initiating, broaching or suggesting the 
commission of the offense charged.”17  It is clearly that inducement 
requires more than merely the furnishing of an opportunity for crime.18
An offer to purchase drugs at market price, for example, is not an 
inducement.19  Nor does inducement require that the government 
agent’s conduct caused the defendant to commit the crime; rather it 
merely requires that the conduct “could have caused an indisposed 
COMMENTARIES, supra note 6, § 409 n.9 (providing examples).  Only about a dozen 
states have opted for the alternative objective approach.  See infra note 41.  
14 Federal courts, lacking the power to create either substantive criminal laws or 
defenses, have determined that, in enacting various criminal offense, Congress 
intended that those entrapped not be convicted.  See Sorrells v.  United States, 287 
U.S. 435, 446-48 (1932).  As Park notes, whatever the plausibility of this 
determination with respect to early statutes used to prosecute the entrapped, “there is 
nothing extraordinary in assuming that Congress intends its [latter] enactments to be 
subject to the entrapment defense, just as they are subject other common law defense 
(such as insanity and duress).”  Roger Park, The Entrapment Controversy, 60 MINN.  
L.  REV. 163, 247 (1976).
15 See MARCUS, THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE, supra note 5, § 6.05.  Some 
jurisdictions accept a lesser evidentiary showing.  Id.
16 See id. § 6.07.
17 United States v. Sherman, 200 F.2d 880, 883 (2d Cir. 1952) (Hand, J.).  Accord
United States v. Dunn, 779 F.2d 157, 158 (2d Cir.1985).
18 See United Sates v.  Bibbey, 735 F.2d 619, 621-22 (1st Cir.  1984); United 
States v. Randolph, 738 F.2d 244 (8th Cir.  1984); State v. Kotwitz, 549 So.2d 351, 
357 (La. App.  1989).
19 See, e.g., Ruggs v.  State, 601 So.2d 508, 511 (Ala.  Crim.  App.  1992).
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person to commit the crime.”20  Significantly, there is no formal 
requirement the inducement offered by the government rise to a 
particular level of persuasiveness or pressure.21  For example, 
entrapment has been found where a 1930s prohibition agent, after 
establishing that he and the defendant had served in the same army 
division, merely made repeated requests for illegal liquor to the 
defendant.22  Likewise, entrapment has been found based merely on 
repeated requests for narcotics by an acquaintance claiming to need 
them to assuage his addition.23  Rather than focusing on the conduct of 
the tempter, the requirement of inducement in practice seems to focus 
on the status of the tempter.24  Only government inducement will 
qualify a defendant for entrapment.25  Where the government has 
played no significant role, the question of a predisposition need not 
arise.  The requirement of inducement acts as a gate-keeping measure 
for the real ball game in entrapment litigation: the question of a 
predisposition.
Whether a person is predisposed is based on the person’s 
disposition prior to his first contact with government agents.26  The 
question is whether, at that point, he was “ready and willing” to commit 
the crime “whenever the opportunity was afforded.”27  Such a query is 
unusual.  Traditionally, the criminal law has shied away from the direct 
inquiry whether a person is predisposed to criminality.  It has been 
thought that findings of a criminal predisposition, that is, propensity for 
20 United States v. Kelly, 748 F.2d 691, 691 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
21 United States v. Licursi, 525 F.2d 1164, 1168 (2d Cir. 1975) (inducement 
involves only “‘the Government’s initiation of the crime and not . . . the degree of 
pressure exerted’”) (citing United States v. Riley, 363 F.2d 955, 958 (2d Cir., 1966)).
22 See Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 439-40 (1932).
23 See Sherman v. United States, 365 U.S.369, 370-71 (1958).
24 See United States v. Borum, 584 F.2d 424, 427 (C.A.D.C.,1978) (“While 
predisposition is the key issue, it does not totally subsume the question of 
inducement, for separate consideration of the inducement issue illuminates one 
critical, additional element of the entrapment defense: instigation of the criminal act 
by government agent.”).
25 See MARCUS, THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE, supra note 5, § 8.03 (citing, inter 
alia, United States v. Manzella, 791 F.2d 1263, 1269 (7th Cir.  1986) (“There is no 
defense of private entrapment.”)).
26 See Jacobson, 500 U.S. at 549 (holding that predisposition must exist not only 
prior to inducement, but prior to government contact).
27 Id.
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crime before any crime has been attempted, could not be made with 
sufficient reliability to warrant the imprisonment of those so 
identified.28  Dangerous people, of course, must be identified and 
incapacitated.  Yet rather than predicating liability on a predisposition 
alone, the criminal law has favored the establishment of inchoate 
offenses, such as attempt and conspiracy.  Liability for these offenses 
requires a finding of criminal intent.29  Intent implies a conscious state 
of mind,30 rather than merely a disposition, which is simply a tendency, 
or potential, to respond to a stimulus.  Furthermore, inchoate offenses 
generally include an “overt act” requirement to supplement and bolster 
the finding of criminal intent.31  Entrapment thus presents a stark 
exception to the general reluctance to inquire directly about a criminal 
propensity.
The existence of a predisposition is in most cases a question of 
fact for the jury.  In reviewing jury findings of a predisposition, courts 
have identified a number of factors relevant to whether predispositions 
to the offense charge existed: (1) the character or reputation of the 
defendant, including any prior criminal record; (2) whether the 
government initially suggested the criminal activity; (3) whether the 
defendant engaged in the crime for profit; (4) the nature of the 
government inducement; and, most importantly,  (5) whether the 
defendant expressed reluctance to commit the crime which had to be 
overcome through repeated government inducement.32
Although theoretically distinct, in practice inquiries into the 
existence of inducement and predisposition often overlap.  Factors (2), 
(4) and (5) relate directly to possible actions of the government in 
encouraging the crime.  This overlap should be no surprise.  The 
28 See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING REPORT at 
32 (April 11, 2003) (“Much research on selective incapacitation has been performed 
since 1962, and the brunt of the findings is that it is difficult to predict future serious 
criminal behavior with acceptable levels of accuracy.”)
29 See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 5.01(1), 5.03(1)& (b); LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW, 
supra  note 5, §§ 11.3, 12.2(3).
30 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a) & (b); LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 5.2.
31 See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 5.01(2) (requiring act that strongly corroborates 
actor’s criminal intent),  5.03(5) (requiring overt act for conspiracy unless conspiracy 
to engage in felony of first or second degree); LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 5, 
§§ 11.4, 12.2.
32 See United States v. Smith, 802 F.2d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir.  1986).
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entrapment defense is commonly raised in circumstances where the 
defendant has indisputably committed a criminal act.33  This act itself 
implies the existence of a predisposition since in most cases, those who 
commit criminal acts were disposed to do so.  The government in effect 
relies on an overt act after the inducement to demonstrate 
predisposition at the time of the inducement.34  The strength of such an 
inference naturally varies inversely with the strength of the inducement.  
The weaker the inducement, the greater the need to posit a 
predisposition to crime to explain the defendant’s act, and the stronger 
the inference to predisposition.35  Therefore, while there is no formal 
requirement that the inducement be particularly powerful in order to 
establish the defense, only where it is strong will the defendant be able 
to avoid the inference to predisposition, defeating his claim.
Other issues concerning the scope of the defense have not been 
clearly resolved.  For example, should a defendant be entitled to the 
defense in cases where he desired to commit the offense charged, but 
where, but for the government’s involvement, it is clear that he would 
not have?  For example, D wants to counterfeit money, but is 
completely without the resources to do so before government agents 
supply D with the necessary equipment.36  Likewise, should the 
defendant be considered predisposed to a criminal act if he has some 
identifiable desire to engage in it, but has deeply embedded character 
traits that would, but for government action, have constrained him from 
engaging in the act?37  Finally, how similar must be the crime actually 
33 In order to raise the entrapment defense, a defendant need not concede prima 
facie liability.  Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58 (1988).  Nevertheless, because 
of the government’s first-hand involvement in the events leading to the arrest, the 
evidence that the defendant engaged in prohibited conduct is usually strong and often 
uncontested.
34 See Harrison v. State, 442 A.2d 1377, 1379-80 (Del. 1982) (court explains 
relevancy of defendant’s response to inducement to predisposition.)  Kadis v. United 
States, 373 F.2d 370, 373 (1sr Cir. 1967).  See Roger Park, The Entrapment 
Controversy, 60 MINN.  L.  REV. 163, 200 (1976).
35 See Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 550 (stating in typical case, defense of little use 
because “the ready commission of the criminal act amply demonstrates the
defendant’s predisposition”).
36 See text accompanying notes 203-207, infra.
37 This issue is raised in Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 559-60 (suggesting that 
government’s overcoming a person’s tendency to respect the law should not be 
equating with creating predisposition).
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committed and the crime intended?  For example, if it is found that the 
defendant planned to sell one quantity or type of contraband on a 
particular occasion to a particular class of person, and was induced to 
sell a very/somewhat/slightly different quantity or type of contraband, 
on another occasion to a person of another class, should he be entitled 
to the entrapment defense?38
B.  Basics of the Objective Version
The objective version of the defense is simpler in structure that 
the subjective version.  The central issue is simply whether the 
government’s conduct creates a substantial risk that such an offense 
will be would be committed by “persons other than those ready to 
commit it”39 or alternatively, by “normally law-abiding citizens.”40
These formulations of the defense, found respectively in the Model 
Penal Code and the Brown Draft of a New Federal Criminal Code, have 
been the basis for entrapment defenses adopted by decision or statute in 
about a dozen states.41  In such jurisdictions, the defendant bears the 
burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence the existence 
of the substantial risk.
38
  In federal court, the jury is asked whether the crime the defendant was 
predisposed to commit was “of the character” actually committed.  Beyond that, one 
scholar has commented, the matter is considered “quintessential[ly] [a] jury issue.” 
Park, The Entrapment Controversy, supra note 14, at 178.
39 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13(2).
40 Final Report of the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal 
Laws, Proposed New Federal Criminal Code § 702 (1971).
41 MARCUS, THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE, supra note 5 at 169.  See , e.g., Ark. 
Code Ann. § 5-2-209 (1987) (“Entrapment occurs when a law enforcement officer . . . 
induces the commission of an offense by using persuasion or other means likely to 
cause normally law_abiding persons to commit the offense.”); Utah Code Ann.  § 76-
2-303  (“Entrapment occurs when a law enforcement officer . . . induces the 
commission of an offense . . .by methods creating a substantial risk that the offense 
would be committed by one not otherwise ready to commit it.”).  In addition, a 
defense based on outrageous governmental conduct in instigating criminal activity 
exists under the Due Process Clause.  See MARCUS, THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE, 
supra note 5, ch.  7.  This defense resembles the objective version of entrapment 
insofar as it can be established based solely on governmental conduct; the defendant’s 
disposition is irrelevant.  Id.  at 291.   The primary difference between the two is that 
in order to establish the Due Process defense, a much greater degree of control, 
entanglement, and overreaching must be show.  See Kenneth M. Lord, Entrapment 
and Due Process: Moving Toward a Dual System of Defenses, FLA.  ST.  U.  L.  REV.
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In contrast to the subjective version of the defense, the 
defendant’s characteristics, including any predisposition to crime, are 
irrelevant.  The focus of the inquiry is how the police conduct at issue 
may affect a member of the public in the abstract, not the defendant in 
particular.42  Of course, it is necessary for the defendant to show that 
the police conduct actually targeted him or might have caused the 
conduct.43 For example, there still would be liability for criminal 
conduct occurring before the improper police conduct. 44  Examples of 
government conduct found to have violated the objective standard 
include appealing to a close personal relationship with the defendant,45
forming a sexual relationship with the defendant,46 and offering 
excessive amounts of money.47  There is also a significant procedural 
difference between the two versions of the defense.  Unlike the 
subjective test, the objective test is typically a matter for the court, not 
the jury, to apply, with the defendant shouldering the burden of proof.48
463, 505 (1998).  Because Due Process entrapment claims are subsumed by the 
objective version of the entrapment defense, they present no novel issues, and shall 
not be discussed specifically by this Article.
42 It may be argued that even standard objective formulation does not allow of the 
acquittal of a defendant who was dead set on committing the offense.  The Model 
Penal Code, for example, defines “unlawful entrapment” as conduct by which an 
officer “induces or encourages another person” to commit the charged offense.  Id.  at 
§ 2.13(1).  “Induces” suggests a causal relation between the action of the police and 
the criminal conduct of the defendant.  A person who was going to engage in conduct 
anyway might not be said to be induced to it.  If inducement was required, a relatively 
weak subjective component would be included in the MPC test.  “Encourages,” the 
other term employed, however, does not necessarily imply a causal relation.   
Encouragement to act may be given to a person who does not need it because she was 
going to act anyway.  If encouragement by the police is all that is necessary, the MPC 
formulation is wholly objective.
43 See People v. Crawford, 372 N.W.2d 550, 552 (Mich. App. 1985). 
44 See Municipality of Anchorage v. Flanagan, 649 P.2d 956 (Alaska. App. 
1982).
45 See, e.g, Commonwealth v.  Lucci, 662 A.2d 1 (Sup. Ct. Pa. 1995); Dial v. 
Florida, 799 So.2d 407 (Ct. App. Fla. 2001); Michigan v. Soper, 226 N.W.2d 691 (Ct. 
App. Mich. 1975); Montana v. Kamrud, 611 P.2d 188 (Mont. 1980).
46 People v. Wisneski, 292 N.W.2d 196 (Mich. App. 1980).
47 See, e.g., Grossman v. State, 457 P.2d 226, 230 (Ala. 1969).
48 See MARCUS, THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE, supra note 5, at 85 n.20, 183; 
M.P.C. § 2.13(2).  The objective test is essentially a test of the propriety of police 
conduct.  Advocates of the objective test thus placed it in the hands of the courts on 
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A common problem arises in applying the objective version of 
entrapment.  In order to determine the effect of the government’s 
conduct on hypothetical persons who are not ready to commit the 
offense (or hypothetical law-abiding citizens), the court must decide 
what features the hypothetical person has.  For example, where a 
recovering drug addict claims she was entrapped, should the court 
consider the effect of the government conduct on an ordinary person 
who is not ready to commit the crime, or recovering drug addict who is 
not ready to commit the crime?  The choice may make a difference in 
the outcome of the test.  A recovering drug addict may be likely to 
respond to certain government encouragement to possess drugs where a 
person who was not addicted might not be likely to when faced with the 
same conduct.49  In other contexts where the behavior of a hypothetical 
person is relevant to determining the defendant’s liability, the Model 
Penal Code has opted for partial relativization by asking what an 
average person “in the actor’s situation” would do.50  Such a 
formulation would be broad enough to allow, but  not require, the jury 
to consider the effect of the government’s conduct on those who have 
an above-average disposition toward crime, such as drug users, even if 
they are not ready to commit the offense.
C.  Relation of the Subjective and Objective Versions
At this stage, subjective and objective versions of the entrapment 
defense may be usefully compared.  On the formal level, both versions 
have a critical hypothetical component.  Under the subjective version, 
the prosecution may be required to establish the defendant’s criminal 
disposition.  To assert a person, P, has a disposition to do X is to assert 
that if certain hypothetical conditions obtained, P would do X.   Under 
the objective test, the defendant must show the effect of the police 
conduct on a hypothetical law-abiding actor.  The critical questions of 
each version of the defense neatly compare as follows:
the ground that, while juries properly judged defendants, only courts should judge the 
police.  See United States v. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 457 (Roberts, J., dissenting). 
49 See Park, The Entrapment Controversy, supra note 14, at 204 (“An agent’s 
knowledge that his target has a weakness for a vice crime but is currently abstaining 
is surely a fact that merits consideration when assessing the agent’s conduct.”)
50 See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 210.3(1)(b), 2.02(2)(d) (manslaughter and 
negligent conduct).
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Subjective – Would the crime have likely 
occurred if the defendant had been placed in a 
hypothetical set of circumstances without the 
police agent’s excessive encouragement toward 
crime?
Objective – Would the crime have likely 
occurred if the police agent had been placed in 
a hypothetical set of circumstances without the
defendant’s excessive inclination toward crime?
The tests are the mirror images of each other.
Turning to the application of the tests, there are two potential 
categories of cases where the objective and subjective version of 
entrapment may diverge.  The first is cases where the defendant is 
entitled to only the subjective version of the defense.  Such cases may 
arise because the subjective version formally does not require the high 
level of encouragement required by the objective test (encouragement 
sufficient to affect an average citizen)–just inducement without 
predisposition.  Thus, there might be perpetrators found to be subjected 
to only minimal encouragement (and hence not eligible for the
objective defense) yet still be subject to inducement and also 
nonpredisposed (hence entitled to the subjective defense).   
Accordingly, Professor Park has written, “Federal law is more 
favorable to nondisposed defendants who succumbed to inducements 
not sufficiently compelling to be deemed improper [under the objective 
standard].”51
The potential class of defendants favored by the subjective 
version, however, is likely very small.  In order to be eligible for the 
subjective version of the test, a person must not be predisposed to 
commit the crime.  If the nonpredisposed are defined as those not ready 
and willing to commit the crime, there will be no defendants who 
qualify for the subjective version unless they were exposed to an 
inducement powerful enough to create a risk for those not otherwise 
ready and willing.  They would then qualify for the objective version as 
well.  This convergence of the tests follows from the subjective 
51 Park, The Entrapment Controversy, supra note 14, at 199.
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version’s tendency, discussed earlier,52 to require a strong inducement 
to avoid the inference–fatal to defendant’s claim–of predisposition.
For example, in United States v. Jacobson,53 the Supreme Court 
found that, as a matter of law, the defendant had established the 
entrapment defense in its subjective version.  The defendant had been 
induced to order child pornography as a result of an elaborate 
government sting operation.  The defendant had never purchased child 
pornography previously.  Only after a two and a half year campaign 
involving mailings from five fictitious organizations and a bogus pen 
pal did the defendant place his order.54  On these facts, the Supreme 
Court concluded that the prosecution had failed to establish beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant was predisposed to violating the 
Child Protection Act of 1984, which criminalizes the knowing receipt 
through the mails of a “visual depiction [that] involves the use of a 
minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.”55  Now imagine that 
subsequently United States Congress adopts the objective version of 
the entrapment defense and, shortly thereafter, the FBI employs similar 
tactics against a person with a provable disposition to possess child 
pornography.  The defendant in this hypothetical case should be able to 
establish the entrapment defense in its new objective form.  In order to 
demonstrate that the FBI’s conduct “creates a substantial risk that such 
an offense would be committed by persons other than those ready to 
commit it,” the defendant would need only cite Jacobson, where a 
person found to be nonpredisposed to commit the offense actually did.  
If the class of law-abiding citizens subsumes the class of 
nonpredisposed persons, satisfaction of the subjection test should entail 
the satisfaction of the objective test.  The objective test’s placement of 
the burden of proof on the defendant, compared to the subjective test’s 
placement on the government of the critical predisposition issue, would 
then account for cases satisfying the subjective test only.56
The second class of cases where the two tests potentially divide 
comprises those cases where the defendant would succeed under the 
objective test but fail under the subjective test.  In such cases, the 
52 See text accompanying note 35, supra.
53 503 U.S.540 (1992).
54 Id. at 542-47.
55 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2)(A) (1984). 
56 See text accompanying notes 16 and 48., supra.
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government agent’s conduct would be judged sufficient to induce a 
nonpredisposed person, and so entitle the defendant to acquittal under 
the objective version, but the defendant herself would be judged 
predisposed, and hence not qualify for the subjective test.
This too may be a small class of cases.  Professor Seidman 
believes that it will be because the conduct alleged to be entrapment 
may be described in a manner that minimizes the possibility that a 
person not ready and willing might be induced by such conduct.  For 
example, the agent’s conduct may be described as “offering a huge 
amount of money to a person strongly suspected of imminent criminal 
activity.”  If such a description is permitted, then despite the strength of 
the inducement there is little chance that that very act would cause an 
innocent person to commit a crime, because the inducement 
definitionally was likely to be not directed at such a person.57  There is 
some support for this interpretation of the objective test.58  Under such 
an interpretation, the only cases where the objective version would 
result in acquittal where the subjective would not would be cases where 
the government inducement was directed at a person thought to be 
nonpredisposed, but in fact it was a predisposed person.  As discussed 
below, these “lucky hit” cases–cases where the police unknowingly 
entrap a criminally disposed person–may be few.
 Professor Allen also thinks that practically there will be few 
cases in which the objective version provides a defense, but the 
subjective version would not.  Allen argues that the inquiries under 
both tests will in practice be similar.  Where the fact-finder concludes 
that the inducement was sufficient to cause an average person to act 
(hence qualifying the defendant under the objective test), the fact-finder 
57 Seidman states, “So long as the police direct their attention toward only those 
likely to be predisposed, the risk of entrapment, objectively considered, is small, and 
the inducement, therefore, presumably permissible.”  Louis Michael Seidman, The 
Supreme Court, Entrapment, and Our Criminal Justice Dilemma, 1982 SUP.  CT.  
REV.119-20.
58 Park agrees and writes, “The substantiality of the risk created cannot be 
assessed without considering the surrounding circumstances, including facts about the 
target that were  known to the agent.” Park, The Entrapment Controversy, supra note 
14, at 205, 205-08 (discussing Grossman v. Alaska, 457 P.2d 226, 229 (1969) (prior 
conduct of selling relevant to whether police conduct was acceptable under objective 
test) and People v. Turner, 210 N.W.2d 336, 338 (1973) (defendant’s statements 
about heroine relevant to determining whether police conduct was acceptable under 
objective test)).
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would likely have found the defendant nonpredisposed (hence entitling 
any induced defendant to the subjective defense) because it lacks 
evidence of criminality absent improper encouragement.59  In other 
words, the excessive inducement directed at a predisposed person 
deprives the prosecution of the critical inference of criminal act to 
criminal predisposition.  The excessive inducement is an alternative 
plausible explanation of the criminal act.  Likewise, where fact-finder 
concludes that the defendant was predisposed (hence disqualifying the 
defendant from the subjective defense), it would likely not have found 
the inducement to be entrapment under the objective test because there 
is no evidence of the effect of the test on an average person.60
While these points have weight, they likely go too far.  Consider 
Allen’s argument that cases satisfying the objective test will satisfy the 
subjective test.  While the most salient evidence of predisposition may 
be responding to a low level inducement, evidence such as past or 
subsequent criminal acts could support a finding of predisposition even 
in cases of high inducement.61  For example, in Posner v. United 
States,62 the government was permitted to introduce evidence that 
defendant had attempted to buy drugs three and a half months after the 
crime he was charged with committing.63  Such evidence can be quite 
probative of predisposition.  Thus it is conceivable that even a 
defendant could be found predisposed (hence not entitled to the 
subjective defense) where he had been induced by very powerful 
persuasion (hence entitled to the objective defense).
There is a more mundane reason why there will be few cases that 
establish objective entrapment, but not subjective entrapment.  
Objective entrapment requires a high level of persuasiveness, such as 
an appeal from a close friend; subjective entrapment occurs when a 
nonpredisposed person is subject to an inducement.  It will be rare that 
high levels of persuasion (qualifying for objective entrapment) will be 
directed against predisposed persons (ineligible for subjective 
entrapment).  Simply put, the use of such high levels would be overkill.  
59 Ronald J.  Allen, Clarifying Entrapment, 89 J. CRIM.  L. & CRIMINOLOGY 407, 
412-13 (1999).
60 Id.
61 Evidence of such acts is admissible in federal court to establish predisposition.  
Fed. R.  Evid. § 404(b).
62 865 F.2d 654, 657-58 (5th Cir. 1989).
63 See United States v. Posner, 865 F.2d 654, 657-58 (5th Cir. 1989).
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Because the defendant is predisposed, lower levels would suffice to 
induce the criminal conduct necessary for conviction.  Furthermore, 
lower levels would be less likely to arouse the suspicions of the target 
that he was being entrapped.  For example, offering usually high 
amounts of money for drugs may suggest an ulterior purpose.  Finally, 
lower levels would be more useful obtaining a conviction because they 
would not mask critical evidence of predisposition.  The police could 
only be expected to use such unnecessarily strong inducements where 
they mistakenly think their target is nonpredisposed, but to their 
surprise, he is predisposed.  These lucky hit cases will be rare if only 
because persons predisposed to particular crime are relatively rare in 
the general population.
In sum, the most common cases of entrapment, under either 
version, will be when the police use (A) generally compelling 
inducements against (B) nonpredisposed persons.  Under the subjective 
version, (B) is required, and assuming (B), (A) will usually be needed 
for the inducement to result in the defendant’s acting criminally in the 
first place.  Under the objective version, (A) is required and usually 
there will be (B), for why else bother with (A)?  The Article’s analysis 
of entrapment will therefore concentrate on cases with compelling 
inducements turned against nonpredisposed persons.  These cases 
represent the lion’s share of entrapment cases under either version.
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III. Standard Theories of Entrapment
This Article began examining the problematic nature of the 
entrapment defense.  It pointed out that the success of the defense 
turned on the status of the tempting party: If private party, conviction; 
if government agent, acquittal.  Yet the significance of the status of the 
tempting party was not readily apparent.  Why should cases of “private 
entrapment” be treated differently from cases of “government 
entrapment?”64  This Part of the Article canvasses the standard theories 
of entrapment.  These theories may be divided into retributivist, 
utilitarian, civil rights, and autonomy theories.  Each theory may be 
understood, in part, as an attempt to give significance to the status of 
the tempter.  As discussed below, each theory is open to serious 
challenge.
A. Entrapment and Retributivism
Retributivism is a theory about punishment.  Many believe 
retributivist concerns underlie the criminal law.65  Briefly stated, 
64 As used in this Article, “private entrapment” refers to conduct, circumstances, 
and responses thereto involving a private party such that if that party were a 
government agent, then under the law of the jurisdiction, the defendant would be able 
to establish the entrapment defense.  For example, if in an objective jurisdiction, a 
nonpredisposed person is enticed into crime by a private individual offering a  
inducement an ordinary citizen would  be unlikely to resist, that person would be 
privately entrapped.  Private entrapment does not require that the entrapping 
individual act with the purpose or hope that the entrapped individual will be 
prosecuted because this is not a general requirement of entrapment under standard 
formulations.  If the mailings sent in Jacobson, 503 U.S. 540, see text accompanying 
notes 7-8, supra, had been sent by state law enforcement agents merely in an attempt 
to infiltrate an imagined child pornography network, Jacobson’s claim in the 
subsequent federal prosecution should have been affected.
65 See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING REPORT at  
36-41 (April 11, 2003) (endorsing a theory of form of retributivism which allows the 
consideration of utilitarian factors to resolve retributive uncertainty); David Dolinko, 
Three Mistakes of Retributivism, 39 UCLA L. Rev. 1623, 1623 (1992) (claiming that 
retributivism "has enjoyed in recent years so vigorous a revival that it can fairly be 
regarded today as the leading philosophical justification of the institution of criminal 
punishment"); see also CAL PENAL CODE § 1170(a)(1) (West 2003) (“The Legislature 
finds and declares that the purpose of imprisonment for crime is punishment.”).  
Although currently enjoying popularity, retributivism is not without its critics.  See
Russell Christopher, Deterring Retributivism: The Injustice of "Just" Punishment, 96 
NW. U. L.  Rev. 843 (2002).
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retributivists believe that the imposing of criminal sanctions is justified 
to the extent the sanctions are deserved.66  A retributivist theory of the 
entrapment defense would justify the defense on the ground that those 
who are entrapped do not deserve the harsh treatment that attends 
conviction.  Although there are many varieties of retributivism,67
retributivists generally analyze desert as a function of the gravity of the 
wrongdoing at issue and the actor’s culpability for that wrong.68
Logically then, a retributivist theory of entrapment would maintain that 
the defense is sound because the entrapped party has done no wrong or, 
alternatively, is not to blame for the wrong done.  These retributivist 
approaches to entrapment are considered in turn.
1.  Wrongdoing-Based Theories
Professor Carlson pursues the first approach.  He advances the 
view that the entrapment defense is valid from a retributivist 
perspective because “the assumption of wrongfulness must fail in most 
instances of government involvement.”69  Carlson equates wrongful 
conduct with conduct that harms or threatens protected social interests.  
In contrast to cases of private entrapment, Carlson observes, cases of 
government entrapment are initiated, directed, monitored, and 
orchestrated by the police.  The government inevitably will step in to 
make the arrest before the crime can be consummated.  Thus, in 
contrast to cases of private entrapment, there is virtually no chance that 
any social interest will be harmed, and so, Carlson argues, from a 
retributive perspective punishment is not deserved.70
66 FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 12 at 459-60; MICHAEL 
MOORE, PLACING BLAME 87 (1997); Joel Feinberg, The Classic Debate, in 
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 727, 726-29 (Joel Feinberg & Jules Coleman eds., 6th ed. 
2000).
67
  One basic distinction between retributivist theories is the distinction between 
strong and weak brands of retributivism.  Strong brands assert that desert is a 
sufficient condition of punishment; weak brands assert it is merely a necessary 
condition.  See Christopher, Deterring Retributivism, supra note 65 at 865-66.  
Because the Article’s discussion of retributivism equally applies to both versions, the 
distinction shall be ignored.
68 See FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 12 at 461, MOORE, 
PLACING BLAME, supra note 66, at 168.
69 Jonathon C. Carlson, The Act Requirement and the Foundations of the 
Entrapment Defense, VA.  L.  REV.  1011, 1063 (1987).
70 Id.
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Carlson takes too narrow a view of retributivism.  Although 
Carlson considers one variation–contract retributivism–he fails too 
consider another, subjective retributivism.  According to subjective 
retributivism, the wrongfulness of a person’s conduct is to be evaluated 
from the epistemic position of the actor, that is, what the actor thought 
he was doing.71   The dispute between subjective retributivists and 
objective retributivists (those who believe that the wrongfulness of 
conduct is to be judged based on what actually occurred) is far from 
settled.72  Subjective retributivists have a strong claim to giving the 
superior account of punishment for unsuccessful attempts, a universal 
feature of modern criminal law.  A person who attempts a crime 
believes that his conduct creates a risk of the crime being completed.  
The subjectivist explains he deserved to be punished based on that 
belief.  In contrast, objective retributivists must struggle to defend the 
claim that in such cases the person’s conduct was objectively wrongful.  
Often the riskiness of the person’s conduct is appealed to.  From a 
God’s eye point of view, where all facts are taken into account, 
however, the risk that an unsuccessful attempt would succeed was zero.  
The ascription of risk is relative to a vantage point with limited access 
to the facts.  Any other vantage point than God’s, where all the facts are 
known, however, appears morally arbitrary.  Thus, objective 
retributivism founders on the shoals of unsuccessful attempts.73
Subjectivism in turn can be criticized on the ground that it fails to 
account for the common intuition that unsuccessful attempts should be 
71 For the distinction between subjective (or culpability/intent _based theories) 
and objective (or harm/wrongdoing _based theories) of retributivism, see Kevin Cole, 
Killings During Crime: Toward a Discriminating Theory of Strict Liability, 28 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 73, 74_76 (1991); Michael S. Moore, The Independent Moral 
Significance of Wrongdoing, 5 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES, 237 (1994) 
(distinguishing culpability and wrongdoing as independent bases of desert).
72 Compare Joel Feinberg, Equal Punishment for Failed Attempts: Some Bad but 
Instructive Arguments Against It, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 117, 119 (1995) (arguing that 
uncompleted attempts and completed crimes should be treated similarly); Sanford H. 
Kadish, Foreword: The Criminal Law and the Luck of the Draw, 84 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 679, 684_86 (1994) (same); and MOORE, PLACING BLAME, supra note 
66, ch.  5 (arguing results are relevant to desert) ; Leo Katz, Why the Successful 
Assassin Is More Wicked Than the Unsuccessful One, 88 CAL. L. REV. 791 (2000) 
(same).
73 See Larry Alexander, Crime and Culpability, 5 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1, 
17-21 (1994) (attacking the risk account of wrong-doing on these grounds).
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punished less than completed ones.  Nevertheless, in light of the 
weaknesses of its competitor, it is at least a viable form of 
retributivism.  From the perspective of subjective retributivism, those 
governmentally entrapped deserve punishment just like other morally 
culpable defendants who fail to commit the crimes they intended. 
2. Culpability-Based Theories
Most retributive theories of entrapment focus on retributivism’s 
culpability requirement.  Such theories explain the defense on the 
ground that those entrapped are not blameworthy.  Such a theory may 
be imputed to the United States Supreme Court, which has repeatedly 
described those entrapped as “innocents.”74  In retributivists terms, their 
innocence negates the blameworthiness required for punishment.  
Likewise commentators supporting the subjective version of 
entrapment defense have taken the position that defendants should not 
be held liable because they are not blameworthy.  In a much cited 
article, Professor Park argues for the superiority of the subjective 
version of the entrapment defense.  In the course of the article, he 
examines various possible justifications of the entrapment defense.  
According to Park’s theory, the defense is justified because those who 
are entrapped do not meet the retributivist requirements for 
punishment.  To Park, “it seems obvious that they are less blameworthy 
. . . than the ordinary offender.  Since they are less blameworthy, they 
are less deserving of retributive punishment.”75
a.  Culpability and the Problem of Private Entrapment–An 
initial objection to this theory is that it seems inconsistent with the fact 
that the criminal law provides no defense to persons in cases of private 
entrapment.  It is commonly assumed that those who are 
governmentally entrapped and those who are privately entrapped 
74 See Jacobson v. United States, 112 S.Ct.  1535, 1547 (1992) (defense available 
where if jury determines defendant just “innocent dupe”); Sherman v. United States, 
356 U.S. 369, 372, (1958) (distinguishing between "unwary innocent" and "unwary 
criminal"); Sorrells v.  United States, 287 U.S. 435, 442 (1932) (finding where 
disposition to crime is implanted in mind of “innocent person”).
75 Park, The Entrapment Controversy, supra note 14, at 240.  Park also identifies 
as a ground for the defense lack of dangerousness of those entrapped.  Id.  The 
majority of his discussion, however, emphasizes lack of blameworthiness.  Id. at 242 
(arguing defense “properly concerned with culpability”); id. at 239 (asserting 
“[i]njustice” of convicting nonpredisposed persons”); id at 265 (noting his theory 
seeks to “excuse” entrapped).
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equally deserve punishment.76  Retributivists believe that an 
individual’s culpability for risky or harmful conduct is based on his 
subjective attitude toward the risk or harm.  For example, in the 
absence of an excuse or justification, a person who desires to cause the 
harm is culpable for it.  Call this the subjectivity of culpability 
principle.77  Invariably, individuals who are entrapped by government 
agents, like individuals who are entrapped by private parties, believe 
that the person offering the inducement is a private party.  
Governmentally and privately entrapped individuals share the same 
subjective beliefs about the circumstances surrounding their illegal 
conduct, and therefore, all things equal, are equally culpable.  Yet 
private entrapment is no defense.  This fact implies that the privately 
entrapped person is culpable for his conduct, and, based on the 
subjectivity of culpability principle, that the governmentally entrapped 
person is culpable too.
Park is keenly aware of the above argument and the challenge it 
poses to his position.78  Rather than attempting to distinguishing cases 
of government and private entrapment based on considerations of 
culpability, Park adopts an ingenious strategy.  Conceding that those 
76 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.13 cmt.  at 406 
(“Defendants who are aided, solicited, deceived or persuaded by police officials stand 
in the same moral position as those who are aided, solicited, deceived or persuaded by 
other persons . . . .”).
77 In limited circumstances, the criminal law will hold a person liable for harms 
that the actor lacked a subjective attitude toward.  A person may be liable for 
negligence homicide if she causes a death where she failed to be aware her conduct 
risked the life of another and a reasonable person would have been aware of that risk.  
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.4.  A person’s culpability for negligence, however, is 
still strictly a function of subjective factors such as the defendant’s awareness of 
evidence or circumstances that should have led her to appreciate the risk.  See id. § 
2.02(2)(d) (determination of negligence turns on the “circumstances known” to the 
actor.).  
78 In contrast to Park, Carlson believes the governmentally entrapped are morally 
culpable.  Running Park’s argument in reverse, Carlson believes this result is 
necessary because otherwise the privately entrapped would be equally entitled to the 
defense.  Carlson, The Act Requirement and the Foundations of the Entrapment 
Defense, supra note 69, at 1038.  Seidman also makes this argument.  See Seidman, 
The Supreme Court, Entrapment, and Our Criminal Justice Dilemma, supra note 57, 
at 132 (“We know that there is no generally held normative principle precluding 
punishment of defendants succumbing to even very attractive inducements, because a 
defendant offered such an inducement by a private person has no defense to the 
resulting charge.”).
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privately entrapped are nonculpable just like those governmentally 
entrapped, Park argues that “[R]ules intended to excuse nonculpable 
persons from criminal liability must sometimes be limited in scope 
because of the danger of contrived defenses.”79  Park analogizes to the 
mistake of law defense.  Although those who are misled by private 
parties regarding to law seem no less culpable that those who are 
mislead by public officials, the law–arguably justifiably–only extends 
the defense to the latter group.  The reason for this limitation is that 
courts are afraid that otherwise there would be too many cases of 
persons successfully presenting a false entrapment claim to the jury or 
engaging in criminal conduct in the hope they will be able to do so.80
Likewise, Park argues, even though those privately entrapped are not 
culpable, the law properly does not allow them to assert the entrapment 
defense.  To do so would create an unacceptably high risk of abuse in 
the form of collusion and false claims.
Park’s argument is open to challenge.  The criminal law is deeply 
committed to punishing only those who deserve punishment, at least 
where significant penalties are involved.  Retributive limits on 
punishment are not so easily overridden by speculative claims that 
recognizing those limits in cases of private entrapment will lead to 
abuse.  The limitation of the mistake of law defense to those who have 
been misled by public officials is not universally accepted.81
Furthermore, to the extent it is accepted, the limitation need not be 
understood as an example of policy-based concerns of defense abuse 
trumping valid retributive limits.  As a general matter, those who rely 
on the misrepresentation of public officials are in fact less culpable than 
those who rely on the misrepresentations of private parties.  It is more 
reasonable to rely on the representations of those legally charged with 
stating the law because they are usually more knowledgeable.  Those 
who rely on the representation of private parties, know, or should 
know, they are doing so at their own risk.  There is at least a significant 
subjective difference between those who rely on private and 
79 Park, The Entrapment Controversy, supra note 5, at 241.
80 See MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.04, ctm.  at 280.
81 See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:2-4(c)(3) (West 1995) (extending defense to any 
person who "diligently pursues all means available to ascertain the meaning and 
application of the offense to his conduct and honestly and in good faith concludes his 
conduct is not an offense in circumstances in which a law_abiding and prudent person 
would also so conclude").
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government statements of the law.  This difference, rather than public 
policy concerns, can account for limitation of the mistake of law 
defense.  Accordingly, it is far from clear that the government-agent 
limitation of the entrapment defense can satisfactorily be explained 
based on policy-based concerns of abuse.82
The difficulty with Park’s position, however, runs deeper.  Park 
never attempts to defend what he takes to be the “obvious”83 fact that 
those who are entrapped (governmentally or privately) are nonculpable.  
Consider a person who is either not  predisposed to crime and yet yields 
to a necessarily powerful temptation (under the subjective version) or 
who is subjected to a temptation that even a reasonable person might 
well yield to (under the objective version).  Is there any reason to 
believe that this person, who has deliberately chosen wrongly, 84 should 
not be considered nonculpable?  Although intuitions differ sharply on 
the question,85 commentators have given it insufficient attention.86 At 
82 Park, The Entrapment Controversy, supra note 14, at 241.  Park also argues 
that limiting the defense to those governmentally entrapped is justified because of 
other policy-related concerns that distinguish cases of government and private 
entrapment, such as possible wasteful use of police resources and chilling effect on 
political activity.   Id. at 242-43.  These other public-policy rationales are addressed 
infra, §§ III.B-C.
83 Park, The Entrapment Controversy, supra note 14, at 240.
84 There is no requirement under either verison of the entrapment defense that the 
defendant’s ability to reason was somehow overcome by the offer, so that the 
defendant acted “in the heat of passion,” or, more relevantly, the heat of greed.
85 Fletcher, for example, apparently disagrees with Park, asserting in his 
discussion of entrapment that “succumbing to temptation is a paradigm case of 
blameworthy conduct.”  FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 12, at 
542.  Professor Park takes the opposite position that there is “no accepted notion of
culpability applicable to a person” who is entrapped.   Allen, Clarifying Entrapment, 
supra note 59, at 416.  Little argument, however, is provide to support these claims.
86 Although Carlson considers the issue, his analysis is not satisfactory.  Carlson,
contra Park, believes that the entrapped are morally culpable.  He begins with the 
premise that in subjective entrapment jurisdictions, the law correctly ascribes 
culpability to a predisposed person who is induced to crime.  According to Carlson, if 
a predisposed person is blameworthy, so should be the nonpredisposed person who 
responds to the same inducement.  After all, Carlson reasons, in contrast to the 
predisposed who are naturally susceptible to inducements (such as the pedophile), the 
nonpredisposed have no excuse for yielding to a given temptation.  Carlson, The Act 
Requirement and the Foundations of the Entrapment Defense, supra note 69, at 1038.
Carlson rejects any attempt to elevate the nonpredisposed over the predisposed 
due to the latter’s arguable moral inferiority for being predisposed to crime.  Carlson 
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best, the question is controversial, especially when considered in the 
context of the most difficult case: the enticement of a person of 
ordinary resistance.
Below the Article considers two potentially attractive arguments 
for the position that those who are entrapped are not culpable: the first 
based on an analogy to duress, the second based on considerations of 
the practical limits of character.  Although the arguments are ultimately 
rejected, their prima facie appeal may explain why some courts and 
commentators have taken the position that those qualifying for the 
entrapment defense should not be blamed for engaging in criminal acts.
b. Culpability and Duress–The first argument for the 
nonculpability of the entrapped is based on an analogy between 
entrapment and duress.  It proceeds as follows:
Argument from Duress
Persons who engage in prohibited conduct 
as a result of significant threats are entitled to 
the defense of duress.  Depending on the 
jurisdiction, significant threats are threats of 
serious bodily injury or threats a person of 
reasonable firmness would not be able to resist.  
The duress defense is best construed an excuse 
writes that “[b]lame in the criminal law is not normally assessed through an 
examination of the actor’s underlying character or criminal propensities.”  Id. at 1041.  
Accordingly, Carlson believes that just as it would be inconsistent with the criminal 
law’s narrow focus to convict based on propensity alone, e.g., sexual attraction to 
children, so it would be inconsistent to excuse the entrapped on the ground of their 
lack of propensity.  Carlson’s characterization of the criminal law’s approach to 
culpability, however, is only partially correct.  The determination of prima facie 
culpability is an extremely narrow inquiry.  Offense definitions usually only require a 
showing of intent or recklessness, two discrete subjective mental states that must exist 
concurrently with the conduct.  Excuses, however, traditionally allow for a much 
broader inquiry.  They allow the defendant an opportunity to show that, for one 
reason or another, his cases is an exception to the broad rules of thumb for  culpability 
established by the offense definitions.  Although the criminal law is concerned in the 
first instance with whether the definition of the offense has been satisfied, it is, as 
Carlson ultimately acknowledges, id. at 1042 n. 115., concerned at bottom with 
quality of character and virtue.  The general lack of criminal propensities of the 
entrapped should not be bracketed off when assessing their culpability.  It should, at 
least potentially, be available to find them not blameworthy.
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defense, that is, it is grounded on the principle 
that the actor is not culpable for his act because 
he did not have a fair opportunity to not engage 
in it.  There was no fair opportunity because of 
the significant sanction that was being faced
Likewise, persons who engage in prohibited 
conduct as a result of a significant offer 
(whether made by a government agent or private 
party) should be found nonculpable and be 
entitled to a defense.  Here a “significant offer” 
might mean an offer of equivalent value to not 
being seriously harmed or of a magnitude that a 
person of reasonable firmness would not be able 
to resist.  Because of the attractiveness of the 
offer, there was no fair opportunity to resist.  
Acquittal based on the defendant’s 
nonculpability is therefore warranted.87
The Argument from Duress rests on the initial premise that the 
persons subject to duress are not liable because they lacked a fair 
opportunity to act lawfully.  This premise is somewhat controversial.88
87 The preceding argument for nonculpability provides a straightforward account 
of why a nonpredisposed person does not deserve to be punished: in light of the 
magnitude of the offer, he is not blameworthy.  The argument, however, appears less 
successful in explaining why a predisposed person deserves to be acquitted, as he 
would be under the objective version of the defense.  Nevertheless, it may be 
extended by adding the following premise: A person is only culpable for an act if he 
engaged in it as a result of a character flaw, where “as a result” implies the flaw was a 
but-for cause of the act.  This premise is plausible, at least on character theories of 
culpability which ground desert in the manifestation of bad character.  See, e.g, 
FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW supra note 12, at 800 (recommending 
character theory), George Vuoso, Background, Responsibility, and Excuse, 96 YALE 
L.J. 1661 (1987) (same); Michael D.  Bayles, Character, Purpose and Criminal 
Responsibility, 1 LAW & PHIL.  5 (1982) (same).  Where a predisposed actor had 
responded to enticements strong enough to overcome the resistance of a law-abiding 
citizen, the actor’s bad character cannot be inferred from his conduct–a 
nonpredisposed person would have acted similarly.  Thus, if the Duress Argument is 
sound for nonpredisposed actors, it may also account on retributivist grounds for the 
acquittal of predisposed actors under the objective version of entrapment.  In any 
case, as argued in earlier, see text accompanying notes 57-63, supra, most defendants 
who qualify for the objective version will in fact be nonpredisposed.
88 Professor LaFave takes the view that the duress is not an excuse defense based 
on lack of fair opportunity to comply with the law, but a justification defense based 
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Accepting it for the sake of argument, we may focus on the more 
interesting question whether the argument correctly equates acting 
based on threats and offers.  Threats and offers clearly have much in 
common. Both threats and offers provide reasons that potentially bear 
powerfully on a person’s decisions by making a change in the actor’s 
utility dependent on her choice regarding a course of action.
Nevertheless, threats and offers are clearly distinguishable.  In his 
discussion of entrapment, Professor Siedman explains the distinction is 
that offers expand the range of choices, while threats contract the range 
of choices.89  Construed literally, this distinction appears dubious.  
While threats make one option (not engaging in the requested conduct) 
less attractive, it is still an option.  Furthermore, even if this distinction 
is accepted as a matter of definition, it is unclear why it should make a 
moral difference.  Seidman suggests the morally critical fact is that one 
has a right not to be threatened, but not a right to be free of an offer.90
As a matter of rights, this may be so.  But why should this moral 
distinction between the permissibility of threats and offers carry over to 
the response to them?  In his analysis of the offer/threat distinction, 
on the necessity of the defendant’s conduct to avoid the comparatively great 
threatened harm.  See LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 5, at 473-74.  His view is 
supported by the common law formulation of the defense, which requires a serious 
threat and does not extend to murder.  See id. at Professor Dressler takes the opposite 
view, asserting that duress is an excuse for engaging in even unjustified criminal acts.  
Joshua Dressler, Exegesis of the Law of Duress: Justifying the Excuse and Searching 
for Its Proper Limits, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1359-60 (1989).  His view is supported by 
the Model Penal Code formulation of the defense which  would allow a jury to grant 
the defense even in cases of justified conduct, for example the defendant’s killing of 
two to save himself.  See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 (permitting defense for where 
“a person of reasonable firmness in [the defendant’s] situation would have been 
unable to resist [the threat].”).  To the extent that duress is really a justification, it 
cannot provide a useful analogy to understand entrapment.  There may be cases where 
yielding to a threat is justified in the sense of yielding being the lesser evil.  If a 
person faces  death if he does not aid a plan to embezzle $10,000, his aiding would be 
justified.  It is however, difficult to imagine cases whether an enticed person could 
argue justification.  The advantage of the offer could hardly offset the harm of the 
offense.  A person would not be offered $20,00 to aid a plan to embezzle
$10,000.
89 See Seidman, The Supreme Court, Entrapment, and Our Criminal Justice 
Dilemma, supra note 57, at 133.
90 See id. at 134.
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Seidman considers confrontations between homeowners and burglars.91
Seidman points out that homeowners may legally avoid harm by 
resisting burglars, but burglars may not legally realize a benefit by 
taking from homeowners.  Homeowners are facing the threat of losing 
goods; burglars are facing the enticement of gaining goods.  Although 
they both may face the same attraction to the same material goods of 
the homeowner, only the burglar will be liable for acts to secure those 
goods.  Seidman explains this asymmetry on the ground that 
homeowners face a threat of loss while burglars experience merely the 
opportunity for gain.92  This asymmetry, however, does not support or 
explain a general distinction between those who respond to threats and 
those who respond to offers.  Homeowners may use force to defend 
their property because such action is justified; burglars may not use 
force against the homeowner to acquire property because such action is 
not justified.  The law’s right-based distinction between homeowners 
and burglars (who confront equally compelling motivations) therefore 
does not explain or illuminate the distinction being those wrongdoers 
who act because of a threat and those who act because of an offer. 
Seidman’s analysis of entrapment as an expansion of options seems to 
be conceptually accurate, but lacks the normative punch necessary to  
refute the Argument from Duress’s equating of duress and entrapment.
An alternative basis for morally distinguishing the effect of 
threats and offers is made by the philosopher Robert Nozick.  Nozick 
suggests that the critical difference between threats and offers is that 
one would always choose to be made an offer–if can never hurt to have 
the option–but not choose to be subjected to threat.  Approving, at least 
implicitly, the offer that led to the action, one should be held 
responsible for the action no matter how compelling the offer.93  Being 
the recipient of an offer, no matter how overpoweringly tempting, one 
can no more defeat accountability, Nozick might argue, than acting 
based on a hypnotic suggestion that the person requested to have 
implanted in him.  In contrast, the threat was unwelcome.  If 
encountering it could have been avoided, it would have been.  Because 
one lacked a fair opportunity to avoid the threat, one may have lacked a 
91 See id at 133.
92 Id.
93 Robert Nozick, Coercion, in PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE AND METHOD: ESSAYS IN 
HONOR OF ERNEST NAGEL 440 (Sidney Morgenbesser et al. eds., 1969).
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fair opportunity to avoid complying with the threat.  Thus the target of 
a threat, unlike the target of an offer, has a valid excuse for his 
wrongdoing.
The difficulty with Nozick’s argument is that it just pushes the 
problem back a level.  Nozick’s analysis focuses not only on the choice 
between the act and the consequence of not acting, but the hypothetical 
choice between whether to have the choice or not.  It is true that if 
asked whether we would want an offer involving a potential benefit, we 
would choose to have the offer, while we would not choose to be 
exposed to a threat.  But this is only because we are informed that the 
offer will be attractive and we anticipate that we might accept it.  If we 
cannot be blamed for not refusing an extremely attractive offer itself, 
we cannot be blamed for hypothetically choosing to be made such an 
offer.  It is the same attraction to the ultimate benefit that motivates 
both choices.  If we cannot be faulted for yielding to powerful threats 
because these, in appealing to our self-interest, deny us a fair 
opportunity to resist, then we cannot be faulted for yielding to equally 
compelling offers on the ground that these offers were “welcomed.”  
We had no more a fair opportunity to find the offers unwelcome in the 
first place than to resist them once made.
Is there then no satisfying response to the Argument from 
Duress’s equating of yielding to threats and equally compelling offers?  
I suggest the normative basis for the distinction begins with Nozick’s 
and Seidman’s observations that, as a general matter, we are adverse to 
receiving threats and have the right not to be threatened.  Where a 
person is unlawfully threatened, we properly feel sorry for the targeted 
person because he is in a position he should not have to be in.  This 
feeling of compassion then is manifested by generously granting the 
threat’s target an exemption from the usual punishment that follows 
from his unjustified yielding to the threat.  Leniency toward the coerced 
is, if not strictly deserved, at least an appropriate act of charity.  In 
contrast, the person who yields to an offer, something generally 
advantageous, has no claim to sympathy.94  The reason the yielding to 
threats, but not offers, is excusable may also be tied to the idea that 
94 While enticements to crime are legally prohibited, they are not considered a 
wrong against the person solicited, but a wrong against the would-be victim of the 
solicited crimes.  The target of a solicitation, whether accepted or not, cannot bring a 
tort claim against the person making the offer alleging that he was harmed by the 
offer.  
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society has failed the one threatened.  Society seeks to protect persons 
from unlawful threats.  Having itself failed to protect the target of the 
threat from the threat, society should not, as a matter of equity, punish 
the person for yielding to the threat.  This equitable theory of the duress 
defense might be a strange form of pay-back, but it has some intuitive 
resonance.95  If it is correct, it constitutes a more persuasive refutation 
of the Argument from Duress than those previously offered.
c. Culpability and Character Development–Here is a second 
possible argument why those who are entrapped, whether privately or 
governmentally, are not morally blameworthy and so should not be 
punished.
Argument from Limited Resources
As a general matter, the criminal law 
excuses individuals who have made a 
reasonable effort to comply with the law.  For 
example, persons who engage in prohibited 
conduct because they have made a reasonable 
mistake of fact are not culpable.  An actor will 
not be criminally liable for shooting a person if 
the actor reasonably believed that he was either 
shooting a scarecrow or reasonably believed the 
victim was unlawfully attacking him with lethal 
force.  The law does not demand omniscience. 
Likewise, the law does not demand “old heads 
on young shoulders”96 and will take the youth of 
a defendant into account when judging the 
reasonableness of his conduct.  Finally, the law 
does not demand heroism.  Under the duress 
defense, a person will not be held liable for 
committing a crime because of undue pressure.
The reason for granting these excuses turns 
on the fact that we bear some responsibility for 
developing our characters and abilities.  
Choosing the type of person we will be is not as 
easy as choosing an action of a specific 
95 Sanford H. Kadish, Respect for Life and Regard for Rights in the Criminal 
Law, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 871, 884-86 (1976).
96 Director of Public Prosecutions v. Camplin, House of Lords, 2 All Eng.Rep. 
68, 2 W.L.R. 679 (1978).
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occasion.  Nevertheless, as we go through life, 
we make innumerable micro-decisions 
concerning how we will develop our characters 
and abilities.  Excuses reflect the law’s 
recognition that even if we make all the 
appropriate decisions regarding development, 
we will still be limited, fallible and imperfect.  
This is so if only because there must be some 
trade-offs among virtues.  There are many 
virtues worth developing: prudence, self-
discipline, courage, tolerance, sensitivity, 
judgment, loyalty, etc.  Not all can be developed 
to the maximum extent.  The opportunity cost of 
reading an inspiring biography of Ghandi may 
be foregoing a training session for a marathon 
run, a morning at church, or time with one’s 
children.  The greater development of some 
virtues some will result in lesser development of 
others.  Once we have made the correct decision 
concerning the degree to develop various 
virtues, we should not be blamed for the 
resultant limitation of other virtues
In light of this theory of excuses, those who 
yield to offers of the type necessary to establish 
the entrapment defense–those strong enough 
either to induce the nonpredisposed (under the 
subjective version) or to overcome the 
resistance of a law-abiding citizen (under the 
objective version)–should be considered 
blameless.  Persons cannot be expected to 
develop more than a reasonable degree of 
resistance to temptation.  In particular, 
expending too much effort at developing this 
virtue might result in the development of a 
character that was stodgy, stoic, distant, or 
lacking in appreciation of the world’s offerings.  
One cannot be blamed for yielding to temptation 
where one has done all that reasonably should 
be done to steel one’s character.  While the 
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decision to accept the enticement may be wrong, 
the lifestyle decisions that produced it may be 
right.  Appropriate action at this more abstract 
level of decision-making excuses the actor’s 
conduct.
This argument, though attractive in theory, likely goes too far.  
Doubtless we must take responsibility for developing our characters,97
or at least failing to change our character flaws,98 and, through no fault 
of our own, some virtues will be less well developed than they might 
have been had more effort been made.  Nevertheless, if relative to a 
given situation they are deficient, we cannot disown the deficiency on 
the ground we did our best to develop our characters given what we had 
to work with.  We cannot blame our bad choices on our characters 
because, for better or worse, we are our characters.99  There is no 
characterless metaphysical ego that we can identify ourselves with in 
order to distance ourselves from our character.  To assert so would be 
equivalent to claiming that “you” could have been born to different 
parents at a completely different time and place. Character, as much as 
parents and circumstances of birth, is constitutive of self-identity.  This 
conceptual fact has moral implications.  Just as you cannot legitimately 
blame your mother for not bearing “you” ten years later with a different 
father regardless of the objective merit of her decision, so you cannot 
blame your character for your decisions regardless of its objective merit 
of your character.  From the fact that we, as mortals, possess limited 
virtue only follows that we, as mortals, must sometimes be 
blameworthy for our wrongful acts manifesting this limit.
97 See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, Bk.III, ch. 5., translated in THE BASIC 
WORKS OF ARISTOTLE (Richard McKeon ed., 1941) (discussing a person’s power to 
develop virtues or vices and so at least partial responsibility for character); see also
TERENCE IRWIN, ARISTOTLE'S FIRST PRINCIPLES § 182, at 344 (1988) (interpreting 
this chapter of Aristotle); Kyron Huigens, Nietzsche and Aretaic Legal Theory, 24 
CARZ. L.  REV.  563, 575 (2003). Peter Arenella, Convicting the Morally Blameless: 
Reassessing the Relationship Between Legal and Moral Accountability, 39 U.C.L.A. 
L. REV. 1511 (1992).
98 See ROBERT NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 396 (1981) (arguing that 
even if a person may sometimes not be blamed for acquiring a character defect, he 
may be blamed for failing to cure it).
99 See Michael S.  Moore, Choice, Character, and Excuse, 7 SOC. PHIL & POL. 
29, 50 (1990) (making point in context of claim that persons not responsible for 
character because of causal determinism).
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This view of character underlies much of the criminal law.  For 
example, there is no rotten social background defense.100  Lack of 
social resources does not excuse bad character.  The best of us may 
become corrupted if unlucky enough.  Indeed, the corruption of the 
innocent by the environment must happen all the time, unless we 
believe that some people are intrinsically or congenitally evil.  This is 
one aspect of moral luck. We take responsibility for who we are, even 
if it is not our fault for who we are.101
An analogy from the law of homicide also may be illuminating.  
The criminal law imposes liability for negligently causing the death of 
another person.  The existence of criminal negligence is determined by 
considering whether a reasonable person in the defendant’s situation 
would have been aware of the risk associated with her conduct and 
acted otherwise.102  If so, it will not do to argue that instances of 
negligence are inevitable even in reasonable persons.  For example, if 
Jake becomes distracted while driving at the end of a cross-country 
drive and hits and kills a pedestrian whom he would have seen and 
avoided but for his criminal negligence, Jake cannot avoid liability by 
showing that he drove exceptionally well the rest of the trip, pointing 
out that even good drivers like him occasionally suffer lapses of 
attention.  Even reasonable people act unreasonably at times, and when 
they (we) do, they (we) must pay the price.  The yielding to temptation 
of a nonpredisposed person to an excessive temptation is analogous to 
the rare, but inevitable, negligent act of even a person who is 
reasonably attentive and careful.  The only difference is the type of 
mens rea–intent rather than mere negligence.  Being nonpredisposed, 
i.e., reasonably resistant to temptation, may bar liability, but it does not 
do so because being nonpredisposed implies being nonculpable in a 
particular instance.  As a matter of morals, a person should not accept 
100 See United States v. Alexander, 471 F.2d 923, 959 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (upholding 
instruction that jury should not be concerned with whether the defendant had "a rotten 
social background").  See generally, Richard Delgado, “Rotten Social Background”: 
Should the Criminal Law Recognize a Defense of Severe Environmental 
Deprivation?, 3 LAW AND INEQUALITY 9 (1985).
101 Both Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel refer to the fact that some aspects of 
our character are beyond our control as "constitutive luck." See Bernard Williams, 
Moral Luck, in MORAL LUCK: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 20 (1981); Thomas Nagel, 
Moral Luck, in MORTAL QUESTIONS 28 (1979). 
102 See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.02(2)(d), 210.4; LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW, supra
note 5, § 15.4.
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any enticement to wrongdoing, even if a person with a reasonably 
resistant character would accept.  Accordingly, the Lack of Resources 
Argument for excusing some prima facie culpable choices will not fly.
To summarize the argument thus far: Retributivism offers a 
possible, but ultimately unpersuasive, justification for the exoneration 
of those governmentally entrapped.  Though those entrapped rarely 
cause social harm, they have committed wrongdoing, at least in the 
sense they have acted with the intent to engage in acts believed harmful 
to the community.  Furthermore, they have acted culpably.  Unlike 
those who have responded to threats and may invoke the duress 
defense, they have responded to circumstances that society was not 
generally obliged to shield them from and are owed no dispensation.  
Furthermore, though they might not be blamed for failing to develop 
character qualities to resist offers of the type needed to qualify for the 
defense, they may be blamed for failing to resist the offer itself.  
Accordingly, if the entrapment defense is to be justified, it must be so 
on nonretributivist grounds.
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B. Entrapment and Utilitarianism
This section considers whether the entrapment defense is justified 
from a utilitarian perspective.  According to utilitarianism, the correct 
act is the one that maximizes the good.103  The good may be measured 
in terms of happiness, pleasure, utility, wealth, or welfare, depending 
on the brand of utilitarianism.104  Maximizing social welfare requires 
considering the costs and benefits of a course of action.  With respect to 
punishment, reducing crime is the principal benefit offered.  
Punishment reduces crimes by incapacitating, rehabilitating, and 
deterring those who would commit crimes, as well as communicating 
and inculcating norms of appropriate conduct.105  The costs associated 
with punishment include the costs of apprehending, adjudicating and 
incarcerating those to be punished, as well as any lost productivity of 
those punished and the adverse effects on family and friends.  From a 
utilitarian perspective, then, punishing the entrapped is justified only if 
these benefits, as a general matter, outweigh these costs.
Approaching entrapment from a utilitarian perspective is not 
novel.   Professor Allen, for example, takes a law and economics 
perspective on the entrapment defense.106  Allen focuses on the 
subjective version of the defense.  For Allen, the central issue to be 
examined in evaluating the defense is the meaning of “predisposition.”  
Allen believes that virtually everybody has some propensity to crime 
because everybody has a price.  If a person’s price is met, his 
propensity will manifest itself in action.107  The only way to give the 
term “predisposition” content so that it indicates a meaningful 
distinction among those with some propensity to crime, Allen believes, 
is to define “predisposition” in terms of a propensity to respond to a 
particular price.  But what should that price be?  Allen thinks that 
currently prevailing price in the market of criminal behavior is the 
103 JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND 
LEGISLATION 12_13 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., Athlone Press 1970) (1789).
104 See Michael S. Moore, Justifying the Natural Law Theory of Constitutional 
Interpretation, 69 FORD.  L.  REV. 2087, 2108 (2001).
105 See FREDRICK M.  LAWRENCE, PUNISHING HATE: BIAS CRIMES UNDER 
AMERICAN LAW 46 (1999).
106 See Allen, Clarifying Entrapment, supra note 59.  Law-and-economics is an 
outgrowth of utilitarianism applied to legal studies.  See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (5th ed.  1998).
107 See Allen, Clarifying Entrapment, supra note 59, at 413.
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appropriate price to use when defining “predisposition” for the purpose 
of the entrapment doctrine.108  The market price of criminal behavior is 
how much a person in the real world would have to be paid to commit a 
crime.  Allen here adopts the economists expansive view of payments, 
which can include emotional as well as financial or psychological gain.  
The price to commit the crime of distribution of narcotics may be the 
street price of the narcotics, the receipt or peer approval, sexual 
satisfaction, discharge of a moral debt, or career advancement.109
From Allen’s perspective, the exoneration of those falling within 
the entrapment defense is easily explained.  If a nonpredisposed person 
commits a crime, it means that he has accepted an offer that is above 
the market level.  Accepting such an offer, however, tells nothing about 
the likelihood that a person would respond to lesser inducements, such 
as those at or below the market level, which the person might 
realistically encounter.110  Therefore there is no reason to believe that 
those who are entrapped are in need of rehabilitation, incapacitation, or 
deterrence.
1.  Utilitarianism and the Problem of the Private Entrapment
Allen’s argument for the acquittal of the entrapped applies with 
equal force to cases of government and private entrapment.  A 
defendant’s accepting of an above-market criminal solicitation does not 
indicate a real-world propensity to crime whether the offer was made to 
a government agent or private citizen.111  Allen, however, is not 
embarrassed by this implication of his theory.  According to Allen, 
cases of private entrapment will be highly unlikely.  To overpay the 
market price is, in Allen’s view, tantamount to a charitable donation.112
In any event, to the extent that Allens’ theory is inconsistent with 
positive law in recommending the acquittal of a privately entrapped 
person, the theory may be construed as a normative one recommending 
108 See id.  at 415 (“The most fruitful criterion of government inducements we 
have been able to identify to sort out those who have a plausible claim for exoneration 
is whether the inducements exceeds real world market rates . . . .”).
109 See id. at 415 (referring to both “financial and emotional” markets)..
110 See id.  Carlson similarly opines that “if the defendant was encouraged by the 
government its utility as a predictor of danger may reasonably be called into 
question.” Carlson, The Act Requirement and the Foundations of the Entrapment 
Defense, supra note 69, at 1071.
111 Allen, Clarifying Entrapment, supra note 59, at 420.
112 Id. at 421.
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the entrapment defense be expanded to shield even privately entrapped 
nonpredisposed individuals.
Allen’s account of the entrapment defense is questionable.  As 
discussed below, government entrapment would result in palpable 
benefits; the cost would not be prohibitive.
2. The Benefits of Entrapment and Conviction
Contrary to Allen’s claims, there are benefits associated with 
convicting the entrapped. The weak point in Allen’s analysis of 
entrapment is his discussion of deterrence.  Theorists distinguish 
between general specific deterrence–the deterrence of the punished 
person who learns the hard way that crime does not pay–and general 
deterrence–the deterrence of the members of the general population 
who learn the lesson through observation of examples.  Admittedly, 
little utility is achieved through deterring a nonpredisposed person who 
has been induced to crime on one occasion.  Although engaging in 
criminal conduct once may undermine a person’s habitual respect for 
law, being apprehended and charged, or at least caught in the act, 
should be an adverse enough experience to reinforce the norm against 
law breaking.
Allen, however, undervalues the general deterrence effects of 
punishing those who are entrapped, either governmentally or privately.  
First, the nonpredisposed become aware that even their normal level of 
resistance to temptation may not be enough to avoid criminal liability.  
Although it will be rare that a nonpredisposed person has occasion to 
engage in crime, it does happen.  Consider the following case:
Russ is a 46-year-old state trooper who lives 
with his wife and daughter.  While on duty, he is 
approached by Lucy, an undercover officer.  
Lucy is young, attractive, dressed in cut-off 
jeans and t-shirt.  Eventually, the two start 
talking about “partying,” and each admit to 
getting high.  Russ tells her he in general terms 
he has access to drugs.  Over a period of a year, 
they meet a handful of times, Lucy requesting 
Russ obtain drugs for her, and Russ putting her 
off or telling her where she can get them herself.  
They kiss on occasion, and present themselves 
in public as a couple.  Russ develops a romantic 
interest in Lucy.  Russ suggests to Lucy that she 
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move to his town and that he will pay half of the 
rent.  Lucy continually chides Russ for not 
coming through with marijuana. as he says he 
will.  On one occasion, in response to her 
chiding, he her buys $10 worth of marijuana 
which they smoke together.  On a later occasion 
he offers to obtain more, but does not.  Russ is 
charged with unlawful delivery of marijuana 
and criminal conspiracy.113
Russ would probably be considered nonpredisposed and be able to 
establish entrapment if Lucy worked for the police.114  Convicting 
Russ, regardless whether Lucy worked for the police, would plausibly 
deter other older, professional men who might identify with him. 
Seeing Russ taken to jail, they might think, “There but for the Grace of 
God go I” and redouble their conviction not to become involved in 
drugs (or younger women for that matter).
Second, cases of governmental entrapment, the core controversial 
cases, may have a significant deterrence effect on the predisposed.  
Entrapping and convicting a nonpredisposed individual would send an 
enormously powerful message that government is aggressively 
enforcing a given prohibition.  Consider, for example, the facts of 
Jacobson v.  United States.115  The defendant had purchased child 
pornography only after a lengthy and elaborate undercover government 
campaign of enticement.116  If he had been convicted, those disposed to 
purchase child pornography, as well as those disposed to produce it, 
would have reasonably inferred that no one is safe from being targeted 
by a government sting operation.  The government’s commitment to 
expending resources to fight child pornography would be dramatically 
and memorably demonstrated.  Or, as Seidman has observed, “the few 
well-publicized cases of Arab sheiks who turned out to be FBI agents 
are likely to make members of Congress think twice before accepting a 
113 Cf.  Commonwealth v. Thompson, 484 A.2d 159 (Sup. Ct. Pa. 1984) 
(recounting similar facts).
114 In fact, the issue of predisposition was not reached by the Court because it 
applied the objective test.  See id.  If the question whether Russ was predisposed had
been considered, he likely would not have found predisposed because of his long 
record of failing to deliver despite his promises.
115 112 S. Ct. 1535 (1992).
116 See text accompany note 8, supra.
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bribe.”117  Indeed, the apparent irrationality of prosecuting even a 
person who presents little potential threat may attest to the 
government’s retributivist commitment to punishing crime wherever 
and whenever it occurs.118   The rationality of the government’s 
engaging in an act which, considered discreetly, appears irrational, has 
been recognized in other contexts.119
3. The Costs of Convicting the Entrapped
As discussed earlier, utilitarians must consider the costs, as well 
as the benefits, of any proposed course of conduct.  Conviction of the 
governmentally entrapped obviously imposes costs on society, such as 
court costs and the cost of incarceration.  Many of these costs, however, 
are no different from the ones associated with the conviction of the 
privately entrapped.  These costs are not thought to be prohibitively 
high, as demonstrated by the fact that the privately entrapped may not 
invoke the entrapment defense.  Are there costs unique to cases of 
government entrapment which might justify the defense?  This section 
addresses arguments that there is a significant difference between those 
privately and those governmentally entrapped that justifies recognizing 
the entrapment defense for the latter.
The Model Penal Code justifies the entrapment defense based on 
the costs that government entrapment imposed on society.  According 
to the Commentaries, probably the most important consideration 
supporting the defense is “the injury to the reputation of the law 
enforcement institutions that follows the employment of methods 
shocking to the moral standards of the community.”120  Since the 
methods of the police, not the defendant’s subjective mental state, are 
117 See Seidman, The Supreme Court, Entrapment, and Our Criminal Justice 
Dilemma, supra note 57, at 142.
118 See Paul Robinson & John M.  Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. 
REV. 453, 454 (1997) (recognizing the utilitarian value of retributivist policy in 
criminal law).
119 See Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict 18_19 (1960) (applying 
considerations of strategic irrationality to nuclear deterrence); see also Larry 
Alexander, The Deceptive Nature of Rules, 142 U. Penn. L. Rev. 1191, n.9 1195 
(1994) (“If one wants to be a rational deterrer of others' threatening acts, one may 
have to become irrational.”).
120 MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, supra note 6, § 2.13 cmt.  at 406.  
See also, Sherman v.  United Sates, 365 U.S. 435, 380 (1958) (“transcending value at 
stake” is “public confidence in the fair and honorable administration of justice”) 
(Frankfurter, J. concurring).
ANTHONY M. DILLOF 41
the focus of the inquiry, the Commentaries support the objective 
version of the defense.121  Those entrapped should be acquitted, the 
Commentaries imply, not because they have a moral right to be, but 
because acquitting them will remove the incentive of police to engage 
in conduct that harms their own reputation.  If people do not respect the 
police, criminality will be fostered in the long run, contrary to the aims 
of traditional utilitarianism.  The entrapment defense is therefore 
similar to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule.  Both are doctrines 
serving as prophylactic devices to inhibit future police conduct.122
The Model Penal Code’s theory rests on a number of problematic 
assumptions.  First is the assumption that entrapment harms the 
reputation of the police.  The Commentaries state, “In spite of the 
defendant’s moral guilt in committing the crime, he will enlist much 
popular sympathy if he has acted because of shocking police 
conduct.”123  This is empirically doubtful.  As the drafters admit 
elsewhere, the public has never shown great sympathy for those who 
are morally guilty.124  This general truth has been accepted in the 
context of the Fourth Amendment.  The Fourth Amendment right 
against unreasonable searches and seizures is primarily enforced 
through the exclusionary rule,125 rather than civil damage actions.  The 
public, it is thought, would be strongly averse to recognizing the claims 
of a criminal and would have much greater sympathies for the police.126
121 Model Penal Code § 2.13 (defense available when a government agent induces 
a person to engage in criminal conduct through “inducements that create a substantial 
risk that such an offense will be committed by persons other than those ready to 
commit it.”).
122 See United States v.  Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (characterizing 
exclusionary rule as judicially created remedy to designed to safeguard rights through 
deterrence, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved).
123 MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, supra note 6, § 2.13 cmt.  at 407.
124 In its discussion of the entrapment defense, the Commentaries explain why the 
court, rather jury, should determine whether the requirements of defense are met: 
“[T]he rights of persons accused are little understood or respected by the community 
at large.  Juries are apt to give great latitude to the police, at least in relation to an 
otherwise guilty defendant.”  Id. at 418.
125 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1918) 
(establishing the inadmissibility of evidence seized in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment).
126 See Office of Legal Policy, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Truth in Criminal Justice 
Series, Report No. 2, Report to the Attorney General on the Search and Seizure 
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In the context of the Fourth Amendment, the police misconduct is 
starker because a legally recognized interest–the interest in privacy–is 
violated.  In contrast, there is no right, constitutional or statutory, 
against being entrapped.  It is difficult to think that a substantial 
segment of the public would lose respect for the police for 
apprehending a person who voluntarily purchased child pornography or 
dealt in drugs.  This is especially true in those cases under the objective 
version where the defendant was predisposed to the crimes.  In cases of 
nonpredisposed defendants, the most common reaction, as suggested 
earlier, would be an increased wariness and resolve to avoid such 
situations where one might be entrapped.
In any event, when considering the effects of entrapment on crime 
control, the question is not how governmental entrapment would be 
viewed by the majority of citizens who have little propensity to commit 
crime regardless of their respect or lack of respect for the police, but by 
those on the borderline of criminality.  That group likely already has 
little respect for the police.  Compared with police conduct such as 
brutality and racism which affects and disaffects them regularly, 
entrapment of the nonpredisposed likely would have little marginal 
impact on this group’s respect for the law.
This analysis is bolstered by the conduct of the police themselves.  
It seems highly implausible that the police would engage in entrapment 
if it had the effect of harming their reputation.  The police have a strong 
incentive and ability to monitor the public’s perception of them and a 
strong incentive to act in ways to protect their reputation.  It can 
reasonably be inferred from the existence of entrapment that the 
police–the group with the most at stake--do not consider it injurious to 
their reputation.  It is particularly dubious that the police would engage 
in entrapment if it led to greater lawlessness because it undermined the 
public’s respect for law.  In contrast, checks are needed on the types of 
unlawful searches police engage in because those clearly prevent crime.  
The cost to privacy incurred by unlawful police searches is an 
externality of the conduct.  Cost in terms of reputation and lawlessness 
are internalized even without an entrapment doctrine.  Accordingly, 
these costs do not provide a viable explanation of the defense.
Exclusionary Rule (1986), reprinted in 22 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 573 (1989) (identifying 
juries sympathy with  police, not criminals, as a basis of failure to enforce the Fourth 
amendment through civil actions).
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4. Net Value of Entrapment
Quantifying the net effects of any proposed rule of law has 
always been the bane of utilitarianism.  Still, as a broad proposition, it 
is hard to doubt that punishing more will deter more.  Such an effect is 
particularly important in the prevention of so-called victimless crimes, 
such as narcotics trafficking and prostitution, where traditional law-
enforcement techniques are less effective.  Any convictions, even those 
of the nonpredisposed, advance the cause of general deterrence.  
Furthermore, the police have an inherent interest in not expending 
resources where there will be no net reduction in crimes.  It may 
therefore be presumed that the police would only engage in entrapment 
where they had reason to believe significant deterrence would result.127
From the perspective of utilitarianism, punishing the entrapped is 
presumptively defensible.
Admittedly, there may be a segment among the nonpredisposed 
who react as the Model Penal Code Commentaries predict and view the 
practice of government entrapment as “unsavory.”  This would not be 
surprising given the prevalence of the entrapment defense.  However, a 
satisfactory theory of entrapment cannot rest on this public perception.  
Where a practice is inappropriate, the public often senses this on an 
intuitive level.  The task of a theory of entrapment is to articulate a 
valid basis for this intuition.  Thus, the story of the Model Penal Code 
that governmental entrapment is viewed by (at least some of) the public 
as unsavory is likely correct.  However, it cannot be the whole story of 
entrapment.
C. Entrapment and Civil Rights
The civil rights theory of entrapment is a prophylactic theory.  
According to this theory, there is nothing objectionable in theory about 
the government’s entrapping a person; in the typical case, entrapment 
acts as a general deterrent of would-be criminals at an acceptable cost 
and in a manner consistent with desert-based constraints on 
punishment.  Proponents of the civil rights theory of entrapment, 
however, assert that entrapment carries the potential for significant 
abuse.  It has been claimed that “[p]ermitting conviction of 
127 See Seidman, The Supreme Court, Entrapment, and Our Criminal Justice 
Dilemma, supra note 57, at 144 (“To the extent that entrapment doctrine rests on 
efficiency grounds, one would expect the police themselves to be motivated to use 
scarce resources in a manner that maximizes the number of criminals apprehended.”).
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nondisposed persons who have been led astray by police may . . . have 
a chilling effect upon exercise of political freedoms”128 and that “use of 
agents provocateurs to obtain evidence against individuals by inducing 
and participating in criminal acts is a feared tool of government 
oppression.”129  Entrapment, it is charged, might be used against those 
the government disagrees with, undermining the basic civil right of  
participation in the political process.  Furthermore, there is no practical 
way to eliminate this possibility of political targeting short of 
establishing an entrapment defense applicable to all governmentally 
entrapped.  Thus, the defense is arguably needed as a prophylactic to 
eliminate the acceptable risk of the government’s turning political 
enemies into criminals.
As a theory of the historical basis for the entrapment defense, the 
civil rights theory may seem attractive. The entrapment defense is 
“virtually unique to the criminal jurisprudence of the United States.”130
Perhaps its recognition in the United States is  related to this country’s 
unique tradition of respect for civil rights and protection of the political 
process.  The framers of the Constitution were clearly concerned about 
the government’s power to make people into criminals.  The purpose of 
the Bill of Attainder and the Ex Post Facto clauses was to make sure 
this power was not abused.131  Bills of attainder and ex post facto laws 
are objectionable because they make liability depend on facts–identity 
and past acts–that a person has no reasonable chance to avoid.  The use 
of inducements powerful enough to qualifying as entrapment 
accomplishes the same objectionable result through executive, as 
opposed to legislative, action.  The entrapment defense thus might be 
128 Park, The Entrapment Controversy, supra note 14, at 243.  See also MODEL 
PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, supra note 6, § 2.13 cmt.  at 406 (observing 
entrapment “can easily be employed as the expression of personal malice on the part 
of the officer”.).
129 Carlson, The Act Requirement and the Foundations of the Entrapment Defense, 
supra note 69, at 1012.  Carlson also opines absent the entrapment defense, “[t]he 
government may attempt to induce nearly anyone, exercising easily corruptible 
discretion in choosing targets, without respect for the principle of nondiscretionary 
law enforcement . . . .”  Id. at 1089.
130 FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 12, at 541.
131 See Akhil Reed Ahmar, The Supreme Court 1999 Term Foreword: The 
Document and the Doctrine,114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 102 (2000) (noting that the 
singling out known persons for hostile treatment is the obvious concern of the Ex Post 
Facto and Bill of Attainder clauses.)
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thought to have grown out of the same political tradition that produced 
the Bill of Attainder and Ex Post Facto clauses.132  Furthermore, unlike 
government entrapment, private entrapment does not implicate political 
process concerns.  In contrast to government entrapment, the potential 
for one group of private citizens to entrap members of an opposing 
group is counterbalanced by the latter group’s equal ability.  Thus the 
civil rights theory of entrapment provides a solution to the question 
why government, but not private entrapment, is a defense.
Two forceful objections may be advanced against the civil rights 
theory of entrapment.  The first objection is that the potential for abuse 
of entrapment is more theoretical rather than practical.  There is no 
record of entrapment’s having been employed as a weapon against 
those the government disfavors.133  Although public figures who are 
caught in government sting operations commonly cry that they have 
been targeted by their political enemies, such claims rarely have merit.  
For example, in ABSCAM, probably the most notorious example of 
government agents ensnaring political figures, duped middlemen who 
volunteered names of politicians they thought might be open to 
dealings with “Arab sheiks.”134  The targets of the investigation were 
selected based on this information rather than political affiliation.  
Former Mayor of Washington, D.C., Marion Barry was charged with 
three felony and ten misdemeanor counts of violating federal drug laws, 
132
  This historical hypothesis, however, is not supported by the case law.  The 
seminal Supreme Court entrapment cases, see supra note 4, contain not a hint of the 
theory that concern for civil rights and political process underlies the entrapment 
defense.   In contrast, the Supreme Court has given at least passing acknowledgment 
to the view the purpose of the Fourth Amendment’s protection of privacy is to ensure 
the integrity of he political system.  See Smith v.  Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 752 (1979) 
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting in connection challenge to government’s recording 
of telephone numbers “individuals, including members of unpopular political 
organizations or journalists with confidential sources, may legitimately wish to avoid 
disclosure of their personal contacts.”).
133 See Park, The Entrapment Controversy, supra note14, at 237-38 (“Studies of 
police behavior have turned up evidence of corruption, brutality, and violations of 
constitutional rights, but have not found comparable evidence of entrapment.”).
134 See Final Report of the Select Comm. To Study Undercover Activities of 
Components of the Department of Justice, S. Rep. No. 682, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 682-
99 at  16 (1982); See also Irvin B. Nathan, ABSCAM: A Fair and Effective Method for 
Fighting Public Corruption 6-9, printed in ABSCAM ETHICS: MORAL ISSUES AND 
DECEPTION IN LAW ENFORCEMENT (Gerald M. Caplan, ed., 1983) (describing 
operation of ABSCAM investigation).
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and was convicted on one of the latter after he smoked crack cocaine 
with a police agent.135  Although Barry alleged that he was unfairly 
targeted by a police investigation,136 evidence of his frequent drug use, 
perjury, and corruption made him an appropriate subject of 
investigation.137  Of course the absence of cases of entrapment for 
political purposes may be explained by the existence of the entrapment 
defense, which would render such tactics void.  However, the existence 
of a legal doctrine annulling the effects of police conduct rarely is 
completely effective in eliminating the conduct where the police are
motivated to engage in the conduct.  This should not be surprising.  
Where the only sanctioned applied to the government is to return it to 
the status quo ante, there is no reason for the government not to engage 
in the conduct based on the hope that conduct will not be correctly 
identified and redressed.  The legion of cases identifying violations of 
the Fourth Amendment despite the exclusionary rule is ample proof of 
this theory.  Lack of politically-motivated entrapment cases likely 
reflects lack of interest in using entrapment in that manner, as much as 
the belief that in some cases, the defense would preclude conviction.
Nor should it be surprising that the government lacks interest in 
using entrapment as a political tool.  In practice, the government has 
more effective ways of oppressing its opponents if it wished to.  If 
convictions are desired, the government has the simple expedient of 
planting of evidence and engaging in perjury.  Of course in theory, if 
there were no entrapment defense, entrapment would have the 
advantage for the government of guaranteeing conviction.  Evidence 
planting and perjury may be detected.  Yet entrapment requires a high 
degree of subtlety and precision.  Too weak an enticement and it will 
not be attractive to a nondisposed target; too high will cause the target 
to be suspicious.  Evidence planting and perjury is a much more 
practical alternative.  As the recent events in Tulia, Texas demonstrate, 
135 B. Drummond Ayres, Jr., Barry Guilty on One Drug Count, Mistrial is 
Declared on Felonies, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1990, at A1.
136 B. Drummond Ayers, Jr., Calling His Conviction Part of a Racist Plot, Barry 
Starts a Six-Month Prison Term. N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 1991, as A16.
137 See Stuart Taylor, Jr.  The Barry Sting, THE AMERICAN LAWYER 3, 3 (October 
1990) (describing Barry as a person “[a]ny good prosecutor would have wanted to 
nail”).
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it is the technique of choice for obtaining convictions of members of 
disfavored groups.138
Furthermore, the incarceration of political opponents is often an 
unnecessary goal for a government seeking to suppress opposition.   
The entrapment defense does not create a legal right not to be 
entrapped.  Rather, it only creates a defense to criminal liability where 
the police have exercised their legal power to entrap.  The defense 
therefore removes the incentive to entrap only from government agents 
who seek to convict their enemies.  Those in government who wish to 
suppress opposition, however, may be able to achieve their goal 
without the conviction of their target.  A politician’s career may easily 
be destroyed by the publication that he yielded to a temptation, even if 
he was not predisposed to so act and even if it is a temptation that a 
law-abiding citizen might accept.139  As argued earlier, yielding to 
temptation should be regarded as moral failure, even if it a common 
failure.140  This point is sharper when applied to public figures and 
leaders, who are inevitably held to a higher standard by the average 
citizen.  Finally, in its bag of dirty tricks, the government has 
techniques such as harassment, infiltration, monitoring, and smear 
campaigns.  These have a proven track-record.141  With strategies such 
as these, who needs entrapment?
138 In Tulia, Texas, Thomas Coleman, a lone undercover police officer with little 
background in law enforcement, engineered the arrest on drug charges of 46 African-
Americans, resulting in the 38 convictions with prison sentences ranging from 20 to 
90 years.  In the 11 cases the went to trial, all the defendants were found guilty based 
entirely on Coleman’s perjured testimony.  Lee Hockstader, Washington Post, April 
2, 2003, at A3.
139 From 1968 to 1978, forty-eight percent of United States congressmen charged 
with bribery or moral violations failed to be re-elected.  Peters & Welch, The Effects 
of Charges or Corruption on Voting Behavior in Congressional Elections, 74 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 697, 702 (1980).  Marion Barry was acquitted of most of the charges 
based on his smoking crack cocaine with a government agent.  Despite his success in 
court, Barry did not seek to be re-elected as the mayor of Washington D.C.  See Stuart 
Taylor, Jr.  The Barry Sting, THE AMERICAN LAWYER 3 (October 1990).
140 See supra § III.2.b-c.
141 Martin Luther King, Jr. is perhaps the best-know example of a target of 
government initiated smear campaign.  Through the use of wire taps, bugs, and 
informants, the Federal Bureau of Investigation likely complied over a million pages 
on the activities of King and his associates.  The F.B.I. fabricated fake tapes, 
disseminated scandalous disinformation, intimidated supporters, and disrupted fund 
raising activities.  See GERALD D.  MCKNIGHT. THE LAST CRUSADE: MARTIN 
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Second, it is doubtful that the entrapment defense is needed to 
guard against abusive use of persuasive techniques.  The Equal 
Protection Clause forbids prosecutors from using race or religion as 
selection criterion when determining whom to prosecute.142
Prosecuting a person based on his opposition to government policies or 
political views also is unconstitutional, violating either the First 
Amendment or the Equal Protection Clause.143  There is no reason to 
distinguish the constitutionality of selective prosecution on one hand 
and selective investigation/entrapment on the other.144  If established, it 
should constitute a Fourteenth Amendment violation.  Admittedly, it is 
difficult to satisfy the proof requirements in analogous cases of 
selective prosecution.145 It might therefore be argued that the selective 
prosecution defense is an insufficient response to the threat of selective 
entrapment.  The difficulty in establishing the selective prosecution 
defense, however, just reflects the considered judgment that, without a 
LUTHER KING, JR., THE FBI, AND THE POOR PEOPLE’S CAMPAIGN 5-6, 26-27 (1998).  
The F.B.I. also conducted “counterintelligence” activities designed to destroy the 
reputations and careers of those suspected of being communists.  See Kenneth 
O’Reilly, Hoover and the Un-Americans: The FBI, HUAC, and the Red Menace 200-
14 (noting the FBI’s COINTELPRO program carried out over 2000 disruptive 
actions).  For examples of partisan political intelligence gathered by wiretaps and 
other means during the Nixon Administration, the reader is referred to Senate Select 
Comm. to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities and 
the Rights of Americans, S.  Rep. No. 755, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., bk. II, at 235-37 
(1976).  
142 United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996); United States v. Batchelder, 
442 U.S. 114 (1979); Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962).
143 See, e.g., United States v. Crowthers, 456 F.2d 1074 (4th Cir. 1972) 
(permitting discovery on claim by war protestors that prosecution  was intended to 
inhibit the expression of viewpoint).  See also WAYNE LAFAVE, ET AL., CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE 682 (3d ed. 2000) (noting that political activity or membership in a 
political party has been held an impermissible ground for selection for prosecution).
144 See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1986) (racially motivated enforcement 
of facially neutral law violates Equal Protection Clause).
145
  In United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996), the Supreme Court 
considered the claims of Black defendant indicted for selling cocaine that they were 
selectively prosecuted based on their race.  Denying their claims, the Court held 
before being entitled to discovery on the issue, a defendant must produce credible 
evidence that similarly situated defendants of other races could have been prosecuted.  
Id.  at 470.  Furthermore, assuming this threshold can be met, in order to prevail on a 
selective prosecution claim, defendant must establish by clear and convincing 
evidence that the prosecution had a discriminatory effect and purpose.  Id. at 465.
ANTHONY M. DILLOF 49
sufficient showing, it is too costly to society to require the prosecution 
to respond to charges that the decision to prosecute was improperly 
motivated.146  The entrapment defense is not a reasonable solution to 
the problem of improperly motivated targeting of a person because it 
permits even those who were not improperly targeted to assert the 
claim if there is some evidence the requirements of the defense are 
satisfied.  A more sensible solution to the problem of improperly 
motivated investigation would be to lower the standard of proof in 
selection.  The entrapment defense, construed as a device to prevent the 
possibility of politically motivated entrapment, therefore cannot be 
justified.
D. Entrapment and Autonomy
The civil rights theory of entrapment was based on the notion that 
a potentially useful tool of law enforcement was fatally flawed by the 
possibility of misuse.  In contrast, the personal autonomy theory 
maintains that entrapment is intrinsically wrong.  According to this 
theory, the core wrong of entrapment cannot be explained in terms of 
violating the traditional limitations retributivism imposes on the 
government’s power to punish.  Instead appeal must be made to a 
distinct and independent norm: the principle of personal autonomy.  
Because entrapment violates this principle, an entrapped person should 
not be criminally liable.
Professor Carlson advocates the personal autonomy theory of 
entrapment.  Carlson believes that entrapment can be understood in 
light of the criminal law’s act requirement.  It is well established that an 
“act”is required for criminal liability.147  Carlson agrees with Herbert 
Packer that the act requirement protects the “capacity of the individual 
human being to live his life in a reasonable freedom from socially 
imposed external constraints by defining ‘a point of no return beyond 
146 See id. at 468 (identifying costs in refuting claim of selective prosecution as 
diversion of prosecutorial resources and possible of disclosure of prosecutorial 
strategy). 
147 See LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 5, § 3.2(b).  Here “acts,” include 
breaches of legal duties, though action or omission, regardless whether a bodily 
movement is involved.  Id.
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which [such] external constraints may be imposed.’”148 In this manner, 
“[t]he acts requirement shields ‘people’s thoughts and emotions . . . , 
personality patterns and character structures’ from government 
scrutiny, and protects personal autonomy.”149  In other words, requiring 
an act for liability ensures that persons will have a safe harbor–thoughts 
alone and most omissions–which they may occupy with complete 
security and freedom from government interference.
The same respect for personal autonomy, Carlson believes, 
underlies the entrapment defense.  Carlson writes:
When the government encourages crime, it 
directly and prematurely infringes on the realm 
that the act requirement is designed to protect 
from government intervention; the government 
uses its power to affect an individual’s choice 
and behavior before the individual has done 
anything to warrant an invasion of his 
autonomy.150
On this basis, Carlson concludes:
The most objectionable feature of 
encouragement . . . is that the government, by 
using encouragement, is no longer in a neutral 
position vis-a-vis its citizens and the choice that 
they make.  Rather than giving an individual full 
freedom to comply with the law, and thereby 
respecting the individual’s autonomy and ability 
to avoid crime, by offering the encouragement 
the government tries . . . to persuade the 
individual to violate the law.  By manipulating 
the array of choices facing the individual, 
encouragement saps the individual’s ability to 
resist crime and to avoid punishment. . . . . 
[Encouragement] circumvents [the act 
148 Carlson, The Act Requirement and the Foundation of the Entrapment Defense, 
supra note 69, at 1083 (quoting HERBERT PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL 
SANCTION 75 (1968)).
149 See id. at 1083.
150 See id. at 1084 (footnotes omitted).
ANTHONY M. DILLOF 51
requirement’s] restraint on the state’s intrusive 
powers.151
Carlson identifies a disquieting aspect to entrapment.  The point 
might be made by an analogy to a defendant’s creating the conditions 
of his own defense.  As a general principle of criminal law, a defense is 
unavailable if the actor has created the conditions necessary for 
establishing it in order to avoid liability.152  Although this principle is 
not  recognized in its general form, many defenses include 
qualifications consistent with this principle.  For example, intoxication 
may be a defense to certain crimes, but not when it is self-induced for 
the purpose of avoiding liability.153  Likewise, defense of duress is 
unavailable when the actor has unreasonably exposed himself to the 
situation of duress.154  These instances show that the law will not let its 
prohibitions be circumvented by strategic conduct by a defendant who 
has created the condition of his own defense.  In this light, entrapment 
might be characterized as the government’s creating the conditions of 
the defendant’s liability.  Rather than waiting for the person to 
autonomously breach the rules, the government acts strategically in 
violation of established limitations of personal autonomy.  As Carlson 
writes, “[E]ncouragement is clearly intended to circumvent, not honor, 
the act requirement’s core principle that a criminal sanction will be 
imposed only in response to past criminal behavior.”155
The critical issue in evaluating Carlson’s personal autonomy 
theory of the entrapment defense is whether entrapment is an 
illegitimate impingement upon autonomy and individual freedom.  
There is, of course, no general right to be free of government influence
until the point where one commits a criminal act.  Arguably the primary 
purpose of the criminal law is to establish an incentive system to 
strongly influence the choices people make and to guide their conduct.  
Deterring a person from an immoral act is surely a legitimate 
151 See id. at 1086-87 (footnote omitted).
152 See Paul Robinson, Causing the Conditions of One's Own Defense: A Study in 
the Limits of Theory in Criminal Law Doctrine, 71 VA. L. REV. 1 (1985).
153 See LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 5, § 9.5(g) at 480-81; Model Penal 
Code § 2.08.
154 See LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 5, § 9.7(b) nn. 39-40; Model Penal 
Code § 2.08
155 Carlson, The Act Requirement and the Foundation of the Entrapment Defense, 
supra note 69, at 1053.
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interference with an individual’s decision making.  Furthermore, the 
government may sometimes encourage people to engage in conduct 
that it believes is not in their objective interest.  The government may 
encourage people to spend their limited resources on lottery tickets or 
to enlist in the armed forces where they risk death on the battle field.  
More to the point, the government may take measures that push people 
toward crime.  The government may incarcerate a person knowing that 
his exposure to other criminals will increase the chance of his 
recidivism,156 or adopt economic policies that predictably increase the 
unemployment rate, reducing people to poverty that “drives” them into 
crime.  The government may even directly offer strong incentives to 
engage in a specific criminal act to those who are predisposed (under 
the subjective version of entrapment) or, at least, lesser incentives 
(under the objective version) to criminal conduct.  These measures are 
permissible, even though the government is very often not, in Carlson’s 
language, in “neutral position vis-a-vis its citizens and the choice that 
they make.”  In these cases, the government typically hopes the bait 
will be taken.  Acceptable practices, therefore display this “most 
objectionable feature.”
Given that some impingement upon with personal autonomy is 
acceptable, the question is whether it is plausible to assert that 
entrapment should be a defense because of the degree of interference.  
Is the line that separates permissible from impermissible impingements 
from the perspective of personal autonomy roughly the line between 
entrapment and inducements not amounting to entrapment?  It is 
difficult to answer this question because Carlson’s discussion sheds 
little light on the line between permissible and impermissible 
impingements on personal autonomy.  One obvious place to draw the 
line with respect to governmental influence of decision-making is at the 
point where the actor’s decision to engage in crime ceases to be 
autonomous–where the actor is not to blame for the decision.  The 
government’s brainwashing of a person to commit a crime would 
undoubtedly be an improper interference with autonomy, justifying 
exoneration to deter future brainwashing.  As argued previously, 
however, a person who is entrapped is still fully culpable for his 
156 See Joan Petersilia, et al., Prison Versus Probation in California_Implications 
for Crime and Offender Recidivism, 150 PRACTICING L.  INST. 105 (1989) (1,022-
person study prepared for the Department of Justice indicating that, compared to 
probation, imprisonment increases the rate of recidivism among felons).
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conduct.157  Being enticed to crime by an appealing offer is not 
analogous to brainwashing precisely because we believe a person 
should be able to resist such pressures.  This culpability implies that 
decision to engage in criminal conduct in light of the inducement was 
autonomous.  Contrary to Carlson’s claim, even entrapped persons  
have  “full freedom to comply with the law.”  Given culpability, there 
is little room to argue that an entrapped person’s autonomy was 
improperly interfered with.
Finally, Carlson’s theory only offers a partial solution to the 
problem of why the entrapment defense does not apply to cases of 
private entrapment.  An explanation might begin with the following 
reasonable point: recognizing the defense when a government agent 
engages in what amounts to improper interference is justified because 
the defense eliminates the incentive to interfere; in contrast, because 
few private persons who convince others to engage in crime do it so 
that the other may be arrested and convicted, recognizing the defense in 
cases of private entrapment would have no deterrent effect on private 
entrappers.  Nevertheless, if private entrapment, like government 
entrapment, constituted an improper interference with a person’s 
decision-making (that is, a wrong to the person entrapped), one would 
expect either criminal liability over and above accomplice liability or 
civil liability in the form of a tort claim in order to deter such private 
activity.  Neither exists.  There is neither a crime nor tort of entrapping 
(over and above accomplice liability).  Without further elaboration, 
Carlson’s theory does not account for the government actor aspect of 
the entrapment defense.
IV. Entrapment as Unfairness
This section of the Article presents a new theory of entrapment.  
Like the civil rights theory and the personal autonomy theory of the 
previous section, the theory of this section asserts that punishment is 
not necessarily justified if it merely satisfies the requirements of 
traditional utilitarianism and retributivism.  Rather, according to this 
theory, in addition to meeting these requirements, punishment must be 
imposed fairly–a condition elaborated and applied to entrapment below.
157 See supra § II.A.2.
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A. Unfairness Explained
As a conceptual matter, justice is a principle for guiding, or a 
standard for assessing, for the conduct of persons or institutions.  It has 
been described as the first goal of social institutions.158  Justice purports 
to trump, or at least constrain, the government’s pursuit of other ends, 
such as advancing the general welfare.159  Despite its significance, 
justice is not a unitary concept.  Norms of corrective and commutative 
justice, for example, are based on different intuitions about what is 
morally appropriate and apply in different, although sometimes 
overlapping, contexts.160   Justice has many branches, or aspects. 
In the context of the criminal law, justice is usually thought of in 
terms of retributive justice.161  Although there are many conceptions of 
retributivism, they all justify harsh treatment of an actor as an 
intrinsically morally appropriate or permissible response to actor’s 
wrongful conduct toward his victim.162  For punishment to be just, 
there must be the appropriate relation between the person to be 
158 See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 3 (2d ed. 1971); see also THE 
FEDERALIST no. 51, at 358 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 1961) 
(“Justice is the end of government.  It is the end of civil society.”).
159 See RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 158, at 3-4; MICHAEL J. 
SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 3, 14 (1982).
160 See GEORGE P.  FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF LEGAL THOUGHT 80-81 
(1996) (describing corrective justice as responding to disturbances of initially just 
distributions and commutative as responding to inequality that might result in 
exchanging goods).  The basic categories of justice can be traces back to the works of 
Aristotle.  See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, bk. V, chs. 2-5, in 9 THE BASIC WORKS 
OF ARISTOTLE (Richard McKeon ed., Sir W. David Ross trans. 1941).
161 See, e.g., MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL 
LAW, supra note 66, Part I (1997) (arguing criminal law best understood as 
embodying retributive justice norm); David Dolinko, Three Mistakes of Retributivism, 
39 UCLA L. REV. 1623, 1623 (1992) (claiming that retributivism "has enjoyed in 
recent years so vigorous a revival that it can fairly be regarded today as the leading 
philosophical justification of the institution of criminal punishment").
162 Some offenses, such as prostitution, are sometimes described as “victimless.”  
Upon further inspection, however, victimless crimes are thought to actually or 
potentially interfere will an interest of society, such has the interest in public morals 
or health and safety.  It is difficult to imagine an actual offense that cannot be justified 
along these lies.  Furthermore, social interests may be analyzed in terms of the 
interests of the person, actual or future,  that comprise society.  See JOEL FEINBERG, 
THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (1984) (following John Stuart Mill in 
asserting that criminal prohibitions are justified only insofar as they protect legitimate 
interests of others).
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punished and the actual or potential victim.  For this reason, retributive 
justice might fall within the general category of “interactive justice.”163
Some theorists also assert that the concept of punishment involves a 
third entity: an authority to establish the rules and to exact the 
punishment.164  With respect to criminal justice, that entity would be 
the government.  In any case, whether retributive justice is thought of 
as involving a two-place relation of wrongdoer and victim, or a three-
place relation among wrongdoer, victim and government, retributive 
justice focuses narrowly on a relatively limited number of entities as 
they interact on a particular occasion.
In contrast, distributive justice has a much wider focus.  
Distributive justice relates to how benefits and burdens attendant to 
membership or participation in a collective group, such as a community 
or nation, should be allocated across that group.165  An example of a 
theory of distributive justice is Rawls’s difference principle.  According 
to this principle, a social system will be deemed just to the extent its 
institutions maximize the welfare of the least well-off members of 
society, that is, raises the tail end of the wealth distribution curve.166
This principle is a principle of distributive justice because what one 
person is due under it is in part a function of what others are due under 
it.  Whether it is distributively just to levy a tax on the wealthy or to 
grant the wealthy a tax cut depends on the effect of the levy or cut on 
the poor.  In contrast, the principle that social institutions should 
impose burdens that reflect the wrongful conduct of each member of 
the society would be a principle that sounds in retributive justice.  
Burdens for every person are defined independently.  Tort claims have 
been evaluated against principles of distributive justice.167  With 
163 See Richard W.  Wright, The Principles of Justice, 75 NOTRE DAME L.  REV.
1859, 1883 (2000) (dividing forms of justice into “interactive” and “distributive”).
164 See H.L.A. Hart, Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment, in 
PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 5 (1968).
165 See JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 166-67 (1980).
166 See RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 158, at 75-80.
167 See JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS, 350-54 (1992) (justifying 
corrective aspects of tort law in part as preserving second-best distributions of 
resources); Alan L.  Calnan, Distributive and Corrective Justice Issues in 
Contemporary Tobacco Litigation, 27 SW.  U.  L.  REV.  577, 613-22, 633-41 (1998) 
(considering whether regulatory controls and tort actions against tobacco companies 
were consistent with resource allocations based on risk and need); See also FINNIS, 
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limited exceptions,168 however, considerations of distributive justice 
have not been thought relevant in the context of criminal justice.  
Fairness, as explained below, is an aspect of distributive justice.
The meaning of fairness is not well-settled.  It is a term 
acknowledged to have many senses.169  Legal doctrines of fair use, fair 
play, fair warning, and fair dealing, for example, all rest on slightly 
different sets of policy concerns and moral considerations.  Because it 
has no rigid definition, it is not unfair to press “fairness” into service 
again.  For the purpose of this Article, “fairness” shall be defined by 
reference to the following principle:
Fairness Principle
A government practice imposing burdens in 
order to achieve a general social good is fair 
only if the burdens are imposed pursuant to a 
policy to allocate such burdens generally among 
those expected to benefit from the practice.
A government practice is unfair, and hence improper, if it violates this 
principle.  The principle here is stated with a degree of abstractness to 
permit different conceptions of what allocation policies are fair.  For 
example, under one conception of fairness, fairness would require 
highways–a general social good–to be paid for by a fixed tax on all 
drivers; under another, by tolls, a method that would result in some 
drivers paying more than others.  The fairness principle is obviously a 
matter of distributive justice because it concerns the assigning of 
burdens associated with the advancement of the common good.  The 
NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS, supra note 165, at 180-181 (discussing 
distributive justice norms in personal injury litigation).
168 See Sherry F. Colb, Crying Murder When A Woman Refuses a C_Section: The 
Disturbing Implications of a Utah Prosecution, FindLaw's Legal Commentary, at 
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/colb/20040316.html (March 18, 2004) (arguing 
traditional duty-to-aid rules, if applied women carrying fetuses, unfairly burden 
women); Alon Harel and Gideon Parchomovsky, On Hate and Equality, 109 YALE L.  
J.  507 (1999) (arguing that bias crimes unfairly distribute cost of crime occurrence on 
minorities).
169 See Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. 
REV. 961, 1003 n.84 (2001) (noting “fairness has many different meanings, some of 
which stand apart from, and are opposed to, individuals' well_being”); Philip 
Giordano, Invoking Law as a Basis for Identity in Cyberspace, 1998 STAN. TECH. L. 
REV. 1, 69 (1998) (“‘Fairness” has many meanings in the real world.”).
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burden shouldered by one person will be in part a function of the 
burden shouldered by others.
The notion of fairness defined above should have an air to it of 
familiarity.  Fairness is the principle that underlies much of the Takings 
Clause jurisprudence.  The Takings Clause forbids the government 
from taking private property for public use unless just compensation is 
paid.  Thus, for example, absent payment, the government may not 
simply seize the property of a single landowner and convert that 
property into a public park.  A court might explain that one person 
should not have to bear the burden of providing a benefit to be enjoyed 
by all.170  Rather than singling out one person to bear the entire burden, 
the government could have caused the burden to be shared more widely 
through a tax increase to pay compensation to the evicted landowner.  
Accordingly, under the terminology of this Article, the government’s 
appropriation of the property without compensation would be regarded 
as unfair.  Likewise, regulatory restrictions not consistent with fairness 
seem objectionable.  If the government were to require owners of only 
Fords to equip their cars with special pollution control devices, Ford 
owners could legitimately complain that the cost of improved air 
quality was unfairly, hence improperly, being placed on their shoulders.  
Bills of attainder, which imposed criminal sanctions on specifically 
identified individuals, are prohibited by the Constitution.171  A Bill of 
Attainder would be paradigmatically unfair because the burden it 
imposes is not generally allocated under any interpretation of 
“fairness.”172
170 See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (stating that one of the 
principal purposes of the Takings Clause is "to bar Government from forcing some 
people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne 
by the public as a whole."); see also, Nollan v. California Coastal Com'n, 483 U.S. 
825, 836 n.4  (U.S.1987) (noting that if the plaintiffs “were being singled out to bear 
the burden of California's attempt to remedy these problems . . . the State's action, 
even if otherwise valid, might violate either the incorporated Takings Clause . . . .”);
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 605 (2d 1988) (“[T]he just 
compensation requirement [of the Takings Clause] appears to express a limit on the 
government’s power to isolate particular individuals for sacrifice for the general 
good.”).
171 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3, § 10, cl 1.
172 See Akhil Amar, Atainder and Amendment 2: Romer’s Rightness, 95 MICH. L. 
REV. 203, 235 (1996) (noting that bills of attainder offend, inter alia, rule of law 
notions of generality).
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B. Entrapment and Unfairness
The principle of fairness readily applies to matters of crime 
prevention.  To take a well-known example, even facing an unsolved 
series of high-profile crimes, the government should not frame an 
innocent person.  Such an action might be justified on utilitarian 
grounds because it would convince would-be criminals of the 
effectiveness of the police, dissipate public anxiety, and deter 
vigilantism.173  The result has traditionally been explained on the 
ground that framing an innocent person offends retributive justice.174
The impropriety of framing an innocent person, however, may also be 
explained by reference to the principle of fairness.  “Why,” the framed 
person might ask, “should I be the one selected to be framed?  I am just 
one of the much larger group of persons who have no culpable 
connection to the crime.  Why has the burden been placed on my 
shoulders?”  The moral arbitrariness of the police’s swooping down on 
an innocent person and stigmatizing him as a criminal is a second 
reason why the practice is so intuitively disagreeable.
Furthermore, there are intuitively objectionable matters relating to 
crime prevention that cannot be explained by appeal to retributive 
justice.  Consider a case where all police activities are funded by a 
special tax.  If the local government arbitrarily selected a single 
member of the community and imposed the entire tax burden on him, 
this action would not offend principles of retributive justice.  Imposing 
the disproportionate tax would not be a matter of punishment without 
culpability, and contrary to retributivism, because it would not be a 
matter of punishment in the first place.  Punishment typically, perhaps 
173 It has been disputed whether utilitarianism would justify the framing of a 
innocent person in the real world.  See, e.g., Guyora Bender, Framed: Utilitarianism 
and the Punishment of the Innocent 32 RUTGERS L. REV. 132-46 (2000); John Rawls, 
Two Concepts of Rules, 44 PHIL. REV. 3, 11-12 (1955).  Nevertheless, there is no 
doubt that as a conceptual matter utilitarianism might justify such action.
174 See H.J. McCloskey, A Non-Utilitarian Approach to Punishment, 9 INQUIRY
249 (1965); H.J. McCloskey, An Examination of Restricted Utilitarianism, 66 PHIL. 
REV. 466 (1957).  As noted supra text accompanying note 68, retributivism requires 
the appropriate relation between subject of punishment and an actual or potential 
victim in order for punishment to be justified.  The punishment of a person who has 
been framed by the government would be considered unjust because the requisite 
causal or culpable relation between the defendant and the victim is absent. 
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inherently, involves stigmatization or condemnation.175  Although it is 
disagreeable to be taxed, it is neither stigmatizing nor condemnatory.  
Culpability, which is a requisite for punishment, is not a requirement 
for taxation.  Yet such a tax would violate the fairness principle.  A tax 
to fund the police is most appropriately levied on the community as a 
whole because all in the community potentially benefit from the 
protection provided by the police.176  Although the need to raise the tax 
revenue may be great, there is no reason why the burden could not be 
spread more generally through an increase in income or sales taxes.  To 
impose the whole tax on one person would be to make him shoulder a 
disproportionate part of the burden of subsidizing police activities and 
make him the target of arbitrary government action.  The same analysis 
would apply if the government seized one person’s house and 
converted it to the local police station without paying just 
compensation to the house owner.  This would be a clear violation of 
the Takings Clause.
The analysis of entrapment from the perspective of fairness flows 
quickly from these examples.  Expressed baldly, entrapment is 
analogous to the random selection of a person to be taxed to support 
police activities or the appropriation of a person’s home to serve as a 
police station.  The analogy has four aspects to it.  First, entrapping a 
person produces a social benefit enjoyed by all–increased crime 
prevention.  As discussed previously, the entrapping of a person may 
serve to deter generally those would-be criminals in doubt of the 
government’s resources, commitment and capability to root out 
potential evil.  The conviction of an entrapped person thus advances the 
general social goal of crime prevention like an increase in police patrols 
funded by a disproportionate tax or a better- outfitted police station 
located in a citizen’s former home.
175 See JOEL FEINBERG, DOING AND DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF 
RESPONSIBILITY 98  (1970) (“[P]unishment is a conventional device for the 
expression of attitudes of resentment and indignation, and of judgments of 
disapproval and reprobation, on the part either of the punishing authority . . . or of 
those 'in whose name' the punishment is inflicted.”); Joel Feinberg, The Expressive 
Function of Punishment, 49 MONIST 397 (1965), reprinted in DOING AND DESERVING, 
id.
176 The tax might be applied progressively on the reasonable assumption that 
progressive taxation is consistent with distributive justice.
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Second, the nature of the burden imposed is similar.  Being 
targeted for entrapment is not in itself stigmatizing.  A person who is 
entrapped is, under the subjective version of entrapment, by definition a 
law-abiding citizen, or at least, under the objective version, not 
necessarily a person ready and willing to commit a crime.  Being 
targeted for entrapment is thus not akin to being punished.  
Accordingly, it is not something that requires culpability.  
Nevertheless, being targeted for entrapment is potentially burdensome 
because of the consequences.  It is like being subjected to a tax or a 
taking that, while not punitive, is still oppressive.  The only difference 
is that, rather than money or property, however, it is liberty that is 
being unjustly appropriated.
Third, those selected for entrapment are arbitrary members of a 
larger group.  Often it will just be the play of chance that will cause a 
person to be targeted for entrapment.  There may be many with 
attenuated connections to crime who could be lured into it.  It will just 
be bad luck that a police informant who has an incentive to entrap 
happens to know the individual, or that among the many susceptible 
individuals known by the informant, he chooses to pursue one in 
particular.  Likewise, it may be pure coincidence that an undercover 
police officer posing as a prostitute approaches one driver stopped at a 
stop sign to solicit money for sex rather than another driver.177  There 
may be numerous persons who would be willing to buy $870 worth of 
food stamps for $140.  When one such person is selected to be induced 
to crime because he happens to be running an ongoing yard sale, the 
selection is essentially arbitrary.178  In Jacobson, the Supreme Court 
downplayed the defendant’s initial ordering of a lawful publication of 
nude youths, finding that it only indicated “a generic inclination to act 
within a broad range, not all of which is criminal.”179  Many people 
have such a generic inclination.  In this light, Jacobson’s selection as a 
target for encouragement was without justification.  As a general
matter, because the entrapment defense typically arises in cases of 
177 See Ferge v. State 764 N.E.2d 268 (Ind. App. 2002) (finding entrapment as a 
matter of law on similar facts).
178 See People v. Boabley, 493 N.E.2d 369 (App.  Ill.  1986) (finding entrapment 
as a matter of law under similar facts).
179 See Jacobson v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1535, 1541 (1992).
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persons who are not predisposed to crime,180 their selection from the 
general populace of nonpredisposed persons entails arbitrariness.
Fourth, there will usually be more equitable alternatives available 
for spreading the burden of increasing deterrence.  An increase in 
general deterrence can usually be achieved through increasing patrol or 
other traditional reactive law enforcement activities.  These increased 
activities can be funded through general taxation of the population.  
Thus, rather than being concentrated on an arbitrarily chosen member 
of the populace, the populace as a whole will bear the burden necessary 
to achieve a generally lower rate of crime.  Alternatively, and perhaps 
more controversially, increased deterrence could also be achieved in a 
second more equitable way: launching an exponentially more 
aggressive and wide-spread campaign of entrapment.  In such a 
hypothetical world, the complete exoneration of those entrapped would 
not be justified under the unfairness theory because the burden would 
not have been disproportionally imposed.  This conclusion, however, is 
not tantamount to the approval of entrapment.  Because a wide-spread 
campaign of entrapment would entail the increased likelihood of being 
entrapped, in order to achieve the desired level of deterrence, the 
penalty for those entrapped could be made correspondingly light.  
Those entrapped, while not being able to claim they were treated 
unfairly, would enjoy at least a substantial mitigation of their penalty.  
A defacto entrapment defense would exist.
Entrapment as unfairness may be understood in light of the 
philosopher Gerald Dworkin’s views on entrapment.  Dworkin sees in 
entrapment a type of conceptual incoherence.181  On one hand, the law 
is a system of sanctions providing citizens with reasons to obey it; on 
the other hand, agents of the government are providing reasons to 
breach it.  Nevertheless, Dworkin recognizes that:
It is not always incoherent to invite someone to 
do the very act which one is trying to get them 
to avoid doing.  Consider a parent trying to 
teach a child not to touch a stove.  In the case of 
a particularly recalcitrant child the most effect 
180 Lack of predisposition is a formal requirement of the subjection version of the 
defense, see supra note 16, and a common feature of cases satisfying the objective 
version., see text accompanying note 63, supra.
181 See Gerald Dworkin, The Serpent Beguiled Me and I Did Eat: Entrapment and 
the Creation of Crime, 4 LAW AND PHIL. 17, 32 (1985).
UNRAVELING UNLAWFUL ENTRAPMENT 62
technique might be to encourage the child to 
touch the stove in one’s presence.  The slight 
pain now will teach the child to avoid the 
greater pain later.182
Dworkin then remarks:
But this is surely not the model being used by 
the police.  They are interested in deterring 
others or in punishing guilty people.  The end 
being served is not that of the person being 
invited to commit the crime.183
Dworkin’s claim that entrapment is conceptually incoherent thus 
reduces to the point that the end entrapment serves is that of the general 
welfare, not the person entrapped.  This objection has a Kantian ring to 
it: one person is being used for the benefit of others rather than being 
treated an end himself.184  But it is implausible to maintain that one 
should never be used for the benefit of others.  In any progressive tax 
system that funds general services, the wealthy are taxed for the good 
of the poor.  More to the point, we might imagine a school for 
recalcitrant children where it is common that one child is selected and 
invited to engage in the forbidden behavior (taunting an aggressive 
animal, eating too much ice cream, neglecting to study for an 
examination) so that a lesson might be learned by his peers.  The 
practices of such a school would not be more objectionable than 
Dworkin’s example of the child encouraged to touch the hot stove for 
his own benefit.  Over time, the burden of being made an example 
might be broadly shared by the children of the school.  Thus, over the 
long run, those who bear the cost of the system would enjoy the benefit 
of it.  Despite the fact that persons are being used as means to an end 
(at least if every instance is considered discretely), a school’s adopting 
of such a practice is not intuitively objectionable. To the extent that 
burdens are fairly shared, using a person for the benefit of others seems 
acceptable.  The problem with entrapment is exactly that this sharing of 
burdens does not occur.
182 Id. at 32-33.
183 Id. at 32.
184 IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 429 (L. 
Beck trans. 1959) (describing the categorical imperative as the requirement “to treat 
humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end and 
never as a means only").
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In sum, government entrapment in the absence of the entrapment 
defense is offensive because it places significant burdens on a small, 
arbitrary segment of the law-abiding public.  This result is inherent in 
the practice.  The segment entrapped must be small because no society 
can function if most of its members are incarcerated at any given point.  
As discussed earlier, it is conceivable that a society might widely apply 
some extremely minor sanctions to individuals who are entrapped.  
Such a society would be analogous to the school imagined above and 
would be consistent with fairness.  But this society would amount to 
one with a functional entrapment defense because no significant 
penalties would be imposed in cases of entrapment.  Accordingly, in 
any plausible society lacking a functional entrapment defense, 
entrapment will violate the fairness principle.
C.  Possible Objections
This section of the Article considers possible objections to the 
unfairness theory of entrapment.  As discussed, entrapment offends the 
fairness principle.  The general form of the objections to the unfairness 
theory of entrapment is that the fairness principle is itself implausible.  
According to these objections, intuitively acceptable practices violate 
it.  Therefore the principle must be rejected, at least in its unqualified 
form.
1. Unfairness and the Problem of Private Entrapment
This Article began by asking why should the law distinguish 
government and private entrapment.  Any theory of entrapment that 
seeks to explain the existing contours of the defense (as opposed to 
radically reforming the defense), should show why convicting the 
privately entrapped is acceptable, as well as showing why the 
convicting of the governmentally entrapped is not.
The fairness principle, it might be charged, goes too far because 
under it, the conviction of privately entrapped persons is unfair, and 
hence unjust.  Imagine this case:
Susan has no criminal record.  She works at a 
fast food restaurant.  She takes hydrocodone, a 
pain medication for a physical ailment.  Her 
supervisor knows of her use.  The supervisor 
claims to have a friend who is very sick and 
needs the medication.  When Susan offers to 
give the friend her medication, the supervisor 
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suggests Susan needs the money and she 
convinces her to accept a payment of  $5.00 
per tablet.  Susan sells the friend some 
medication, and after continued pressuring 
from her supervisor does it again.  She is 
arrested and charged with sale of the 
hydrocodone.
If Susan’s supervisor is a police informant and the “friend” a detective, 
Susan would likely be able to establish entrapment as a matter of 
law.185  Susan could validly complain that she had been treated 
unfairly.  After all, there are likely many people in like circumstances 
who are similarly susceptible to inducements Susan was subjected to.  
To convict her but not others would be to place a disproportionate share 
on the burden of deterring drug trafficking on her shoulders.  Would 
Susan have a similarly valid complaint of being treated unfairly if the 
supervisor and friend were not government agents?  From her 
perspective of the defendant it “feels” the same whether he has been 
entrapped by the government or another citizen.  In both cases, she has 
been arbitrarily selected from an equally susceptible group and, as a 
result, faces a significant loss of freedom.
It is morally significant that, in cases of private entrapment, the 
government is not responsible for the arbitrary selection.  Rather than 
arbitrarily selecting an individual, the government in convicting a 
privately entrapped person is merely acting on the general principle that 
all persons who have culpably committed wrong should be punished.  
The fairness principle, in this respect, is like many common principles 
of morality and law that distinguish between:
(1) Acting in an improper manner M which 
results in a harm H being imposed on person 
P, and,
(2) Imposing a harm H on person P as a result 
of another’s acting in an improper manner 
M.
The former is prima facie impermissible; the latter permissible.186  For 
example, it would be unjust for a landlord to enter P’s apartment 
185 See Dial v. Florida, 799 So.2d 407 (Ct.  App. Fla. 2001) (finding entrapment as 
a matter of law under similar facts).
186
 Principles such as the one above are described as deontological or, perhaps 
more accurately, agent-relative.  See Michael Moore, Victims and Retribution, A 
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without permission, burn the money P was planning on using to pay the 
rent, and then evict P for failure to pay rent.  However, if a third party 
destroyed P’s money, the landlord may treat P like any other indigent 
person and justly evict P for failure to pay rent.  Because the landlord in 
the latter hypothetical did not cause P to become indigent, the landlord 
may abide by his general practice of evicting those who fail to pay their 
rent.  Under principles of corrective justice, the landlord is responsible 
for correcting only the results of his own wrongdoing, for example, by 
excusing P from paying one month’s rent.  Likewise, to take an 
example from positive law, the Equal Protection Clause prohibits the 
government from denying a person employment based on her race.  If a 
person, however, has suffered private employment discrimination 
resulting in her lacking significant job experience, the government can 
refuse to hire the person based on her lack of experience.187  From the 
perspective of the wronged individual, it feels the same: objectionable 
treatment (theft, discrimination) resulting in a relative disadvantage 
(eviction, unemployment).  The difference is whether the entity in a 
position to alleviate the disadvantage or cause an additional one is the 
entity responsible for the initial mistreatment.  Only where that is the 
case can the person validly complain about the entity’s action.  Because 
in cases of private entrapment the government was not responsible for 
the arbitrary selection, it may follow its general policy of punishing 
culpable wrongdoers.
Taxation provides a particularly germane example.  It is unfair 
and improper for the government to select a person to be taxed based 
Reply to Professor Fletcher, 3 BUFF. CRIM, L.  REV. 65, 70 (1999) (discussing 
concepts).  A common example is the obligation to keep promises.  We are morally 
obliged to keep the promises we make.  However, we are not obliged to help others 
keep their promises, nor alleviate the consequences of promises others have broken.  
In this way deontological/agent-relative principles differ from 
consequentialist/maximizing principles such as utilitarianism.
187 A plaintiff must show discriminatory purpose to establish an Equal Protection 
claim, see Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976) (announcing “the basic 
equal protection principle that invidious quality of a law claimed to be racially 
discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose”).  In 
Davis, the Supreme Court permitted the use of a police department application test 
that Blacks failed at a disproportionate rate because of their weak language skills.  
The fact that this low skill level was likely the effect of attending substandard 
segregated schools, and hence, reinforced the effects of past discrimination, did not 
influence the Court.  See LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra
note 170, at 1511 (criticizing decision).
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on a morally arbitrary characteristic, for example, being  seated at the 
end of a bar in a local nightclub.  However, it is neither unfair nor 
improper for the government to impose a tax based on a morally 
relevant characteristic, such as net income.  This is true even if it is 
morally arbitrary that a person happens to possess that characteristic, 
for example, by winning a large promotion prize based on a random 
drawing.  Likewise, it is unfair and improper for the government to 
target for entrapment the person who happens to be seated at the end of 
bar in a local nightclub, while it is acceptable to prosecute and convict 
someone who others have arbitrarily caused to have the morally 
relevant characteristic of criminal culpability, for example through 
private entrapment.  The following chart compares the previous three 
hypotheticals:
Entity 
Arbitrarily 
Selecting
Criterion 
of 
Selection
Entity
Imposing 
Burden
Burden 
Imposed
Moral Status 
of Imposing 
Burden
Private Party Lottery 
Number
Government Tax Fair
Private Party Location at 
Nightclub
Government Incarceration Fair
Government Location at 
Nightclub
Government Incarceration Unfair
As indicated, imposing a disadvantage is only unfair when the entity 
imposing it is responsible for the initial arbitrary selection.
2.  Fairness and General Law Enforcement Activity
A second possible objection to the fairness theory of entrapment 
is that the fairness principle, if valid, would bar much police activity 
and many convictions that are both clearly legal and intuitively 
acceptable.
Consider, for example, the arbitrary decision of the police to 
patrol one among many neighborhoods one evening, resulting in the 
apprehension of a burglar.  Undoubtedly, there are many other burglars 
equally deserving of arrest and conviction who are not arrested.  Can 
the apprehended burglar argue that convicting him would be unfair?  
After all, although he has not been personally selected from all others 
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burglars to be apprehended, the bottom line is the same.  Because 
standard reactive crime detection practices are not completely effective, 
he, as one among many situated burglars, will have to bear a 
disproportionate burden of advancing general deterrence.  Likewise, 
consider encouragement of criminal conduct by the police that does not 
rise to the level of entrapment.  It is well established that there is no 
entrapment if a police officer simply approaches a person–even without 
probable cause–and offers to buy a quantity of illegal narcotics at their 
street price.188   Such police conduct, to be distinguished from 
inducements powerful enough to support a finding of entrapment, may 
be called “opportunity providing.”  Yet, so goes the objection, would 
not convicting the defendant who has seized the opportunity provided 
for crime violate the fairness principle? After all, there are undoubtedly 
many drug dealers  who would have accepted the offer and he has been 
forced to bear a burden which should be more fairly distributed.
In response to the objection based on standard reactive  crime 
detection practices, such as patrolling one among many areas, it may be 
replied that these practices do not create a disproportionate burden on 
those they apprehend to the extent that entrapment does.  The 
proportion of criminals who are currently apprehended through 
standard police practices is approximately twenty percent.189  In 
contrast, the proportion of nonpredisposed person who are entrapped is 
vanishingly small.  Like most moral principles, unfairness is a matter of 
degree.  To be entrapped is many times more unfair than to be 
apprehended through standard reactive crime detection practices.
A second distinction may be drawn between entrapment and 
standard reactive crime detection practices which, as discussed above, 
fail to spread the burden of crime control across the population of all 
188 Under the subjective version of entrapment, if the offer is accepted, the 
defendant’s predisposition will be established, see State v. Duncan, 330 S.E.2d 481, 
488 (N.C. App. 1985) (“Predisposition may be shown by a defendant’s ready 
compliance, acquiesce in, or  willingness to cooperate in the criminal plan where the 
police merely afforded the defendant an opportunity to commit the crime.”)  Under 
the objective version, the conduct of the police would not be found sufficient to 
induce a law-abiding citizen to sell drugs, see People v.  Crawford, 372 N.W.2d 550, 
553 (Mich. App. 1985) (“[M]ere requests to sell contraband, even repeated request, 
are not conduct likely, when objectively considered, to induce the commission of the 
crime by a person not ready and willing to commit it.”).
189 See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE 
UNITED STATES 2001, 220 (2002).
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criminals.  The fairness principle is a principle of justice.  Justice, 
however, need not be conceived in absolutist terms as a value carrying 
infinite weight.   With due deference to Kant,190 to refuse to commit the 
slightest injustice in order, say, to alleviate the suffering of mankind 
bespeaks a lack of perspective.  While principles of justice may be 
reformulated and qualified to preserve their formal superiority over 
considerations of welfare, some degree of accommodation with other 
values, however that accommodation is conceptualized, must be 
admitted.  Entrapping and convicting a high percentage of the
population through a widespread campaign of entrapment (without any 
mitigation of penalties), while eliminating fairness, is not a realistic 
option for society. Likewise, abandoning standard reactive crime 
detection practices, such as police patrols, while also eliminating 
unfairness, is not a realistic option for society.  Such practices are 
necessary if crime is to be deterred and society protected.  In contrast, 
entrapment, although a cost-effective means of preventing crime,191 is 
not a necessary means.  Other techniques more consistent with the 
demands of fairness, including undercover investigation and 
encouragement not amounting to entrapment, will suffice to achieve a 
reasonable level of crime control.  Thus, not only is the injustice of 
entrapment relatively severe, it is also relatively lacking in justification.
A third, and perhaps the most important, distinction between 
entrapment and other law-enforcement activities, such as opportunity 
providing, is that entrapment is a practice that is unfair by design.  Both 
entrapment and other police enforcement activities distribute burdens 
disproportionately to varying degrees.  The goal of other forms of 
police activity, however, is to be as effective and far-ranging as 
possible.  Although it may be arbitrary which streets the police choose 
to patrol, and so which burglars are arrested, the police would patrol all 
the streets and apprehend all burglars if they could.  Burglars both 
deserve to be punished and their incarceration would prevent them 
from committing further crimes.  Likewise, while it may be arbitrary 
which drug dealers are caught by a police sting operation which 
provides opportunities for crime, such operations are designed to 
apprehend as many drug dealers as possible and it is regrettable that 
190 Cf. IMMANUEL KANT, METAPHYSICAL FIRST PRINCIPLES OF THE DOCTRINE OF 
RIGHT, in THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 141 (Mary Gregor trans., 1991) ("if justice 
goes, there is no longer any value in men's living on the earth.").
191 See supra §§ III.b.2-4.
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through such operations not all drug dealers are apprehended.  For this 
reason, the unfairness of these practices is analogous to the unjustness 
of other aspects of the criminal justice system.  Persons who are not 
liable are sometimes convicted.  Although convicting such persons is 
unjust, it is merely a regrettable, and not a fatal, feature of the criminal 
adjudication system.  In contrast, an adjudication system designed with 
the purpose of convicting those not liable would be deeply disturbing.  
The moral distinction between wrongs done by design and those that 
are merely unavoidable side effects has a long and respected lineage.192
Like an adjudication system designed to convict the innocent, the 
practice of entrapment breaches the norms of justice by design.  Even if 
it were feasible to entrap widely enough to spread equitably the burden 
of conviction among the nonpredisposed, it would not be desirable.  As 
discussed, entrapment is justified as a general deterrent.  It is thus 
inherently a matter of using the few as examples for the many.  If many 
were to be entrapped through a wide-spread and ongoing campaign of 
entrapment, it would demonstrate entrapment’s failure to deter, rather 
than its success.  Furthermore, as discussed above, entrapping and 
imposing significant penalties through a wide-spread campaign of 
entrapment is not a realistic option for society.  Because the practice of 
entrapment is designed to burden the few from the many who 
potentially benefit from it, it violates the fairness principle.
3.  Specific Counter-Examples
This section looks at specific police activities that may seem to 
violate the fairness principle.  The validity of these activities might 
appear to imply that the fairness principle is overbroad and should be 
rejected.
192 This distinction is frequently referred to as the Doctrine of Double Effect, and 
usually traced back to Thomas Aquinas.  See THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA 
THEOLOGICA, II-II, Q. 64, art. 7 (Marcus Lefebure ed., Blackfriars 1975).  A typical 
example illustrating the operation of this doctrine is that it is morally permissible to 
bomb a munitions factory to hasten the end of a war, even if it is foreseen that 
civilians will inevitably be killed by errant bombs. It is not, however, morally 
permissible to drop bombs on civilians in order to hasten the end of the war by 
breaking the morale of the enemy.  See Gerald Dworkin, Intention, Foreseeability, 
and Responsibility, in RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER AND THE EMOTIONS 338, 339 
(Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1987); Warren S. Quinn, Actions, Intentions, and 
Consequences: The Doctrine of Double Effect, 18 PHIL. & PUB. AFF., 334, 334 n.3 
(1989).
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a.  Speeding–It is a common practice for the police to stop only a 
very small percentage of motorists who drive above the speed limit.  
General deterrence is the principal justification of the practice.  As with 
entrapment, the police do not desire to ticket all speeders.  Can be those 
stopped complain of unfairness?
Two considerations mitigate the prima facie unfairness of the 
practice.  First, police in fact do not usually swoop down on an 
arbitrary speeder and ticket her.  Common experience indicates that the 
great majority of highway speeders exceed the speed limit by less than 
25%.  These drivers do not pose a substantial risk because their speed is 
relatively near the limit.  Furthermore, because a substantial number of 
drivers drive in this range, each individual driver, traveling with the 
pace of traffic generally, is not increasing the risk nearly as much as if 
only a few exceeded the speed limit.  In light of these facts, the 
common practice of patrol officers is to stop only those who speed 
“excessively.”  Their choice is not arbitrary, but limited to a group, 
reckless speeders, whom the police would like to apprehend generally.  
In contrast, the police would not like to apprehend generally those 
persons targeted for entrapment.  Second, the penalty associated with 
speeding violations is de minimis compared to the penal sanctions 
associated with the crimes the entrapment defense normally applies to.  
Any unfairness is mitigated proportionately.  If the police randomly 
pulled over one among many drivers traveling 5-10 miles over the 
speed limit on a state highway and, as a result, significant penalties 
were imposed, the practice would become intuitively objectionable.
b.  Tax Audits–Another example of a “random” law enforcement 
technique used primarily for deterrence is tax audits.  These fall within 
the category of necessary evils, that is, cases where the practice serves 
some important social function and this function cannot be achieved 
through a means that spreads the burden more equitably.  It is 
functionally impossible to inspect carefully the hundreds of millions of 
tax returns filed each year.  Maintaining compliance with the income 
tax is an indispensable social goal.  Although most persons 
undoubtedly now file their proper returns not based on the fear of being 
audited, but because of their commitment and belief in the legitimacy 
of the taxation scheme, wide-spread cheating would in time undermine 
the perceived legitimacy of the scheme.  If that tipping point is ever 
reached, the income tax would have to be abandoned.  Accordingly, in 
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contrast to entrapment, some disproportional burdening of individuals 
is necessary.
c. High-Profile Prosecutions–Finally, the not uncommon 
prosecutorial practice of targeting high-profile or celebrity figures is
consistent with the fairness principle.  Prosecutors have brought 
charges against professional athletes, media personalities, and 
politicians in cases where they may not have proceeded against 
members of the general public.193  These decisions may be based on the 
notion that, in terms of deterrence, such prosecutions provide “a bigger 
bang for the buck.”  A high-profile defendant might therefore claim 
that she has been unfairly targeted, arguing that because others 
arrestees would not have been prosecuted, or granted lighter sentences, 
she is being made to shoulder a disproportionate burden of the cost of 
crime prevention.  This argument has an air of plausibility.  Prosecutors 
sometimes deny the premise that they treat defendants based on their 
notoriety,194 likely concerned that otherwise the public may perceive 
them as acting unfairly.  Targeting high-profile figures for prosecution, 
however, may be analogized to the progressive income tax.  Requiring 
all who earn a high income to pay a high tax is arguably consistent with 
distributive justice because (a) there is a good reason why those who 
193 See Vikram David Amar, The Many Ways to Prove Discrimination, 14 
Hastings Women’s L.  J. 171, 178 n.13. (2003) (noting that the Securities and 
Exchange Commission uses high-profile prosecutions to ensure more general 
compliance); Michael A.  Simons, Prosecutorial Discretion and Prosecutorial 
Guidelines, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 893, 964 n.281 (citing cases against sports figured 
brought because of their deterrence value).  See also Erin McClam, Martha Stewart 
Guilty of All Counts, Chattanooga Times Free Press (Tennessee) March 6, 2004, at 
A1 (describing conviction of Martha Stewart; noting her “supporters claim she was
being targeted because of her celebrity status.”); Harriet Chiang, Starr Would Find It 
Difficult To Prove Perjury by Clinton, San Francisco Chronicle, Sept. 18 1998, at A5 
(discussing perjury investigation of Bill Clinton; noting “when someone is charged 
solely with perjury, it often involves a high_profile figure.”); Arianna Huffington,
O.J., Bill and the Perjury Plague, New York Post, July 21, 1998, at 25 (arguing to 
deter perjury “it is so critical that the nation's two highest-profile alleged perjury 
cases–those of O.J. Simpson and Bill Clinton–are pursued to their respective ends.”); 
Mark Helm, Ex_Prosecutors Say Clinton Held to Tougher Standard; Perjury 
Convictions Common, GOP Argues, Times_Picayune (New Orleans, LA) December 
10, 1998, at A10.
194 See Reuters, Colo. Prosecutor Mulls Charges Against Kobe Bryant, (July 7, 2003) 
("In deciding whether to file charges, the same standards apply to Mr. Bryant as apply 
in every other sexual assault case," Hurlbert said. "I will treat this case just like I treat 
any other sex assault case.").
UNRAVELING UNLAWFUL ENTRAPMENT 72
earn more should pay proportionately more, e.g., they can afford it, or 
they have benefitted more from society; and (b) the policy is applied 
generally across all members of a given high income bracket.  
Likewise, targeting high-profile defendants can be justified based on a 
greater-deterrence rationale where such a policy is applied consistently 
to all high-profile defendants.  As noted earlier, the fairness principle, 
like any principle of justice, may admit different interpretations 
consistent with its broad terms.195
Entrapment, however, may not be defended along these lines.  As 
a rule, the police do not attempt to entrap all members of a given group, 
even if the group is defined narrowly, in a manner analogous to “high 
income persons.”  Consider the following, not atypical, case of 
entrapment.
Ken is desperately in need of money.  He 
approaches Rocky, a confidential police 
informant, for a loan.  Rocky refuses, but 
convinces Ken, who has no history of drug use, 
to join a drug transaction.  Ken and Rocky drive 
to a highway intersection where they meet Willy, 
an undercover police officer.  Willy gives Ken 
$300.  Willy and Ken agree to meet later that 
day to complete the transaction.  Ken 
reluctantly accepts a bag containing 3 grams of 
cocaine from Rocky.  Rocky, Ken and Willy later 
meet in a parking lot.  When Ken gives Willy the 
bag, he is arrested and charged with dealing in 
cocaine.  On appeal of his conviction, Ken is 
found not to be predisposed as a matter of law 
and exonerated based on the entrapment 
defense.196
Many people like Ken are in desperate financial straits.  Many 
undoubtedly could be pressed against their better judgment into playing 
an insignificant role in a minor drug transaction.  The police have no 
general interest in entrapping all such persons.  Ken, although having 
no history of drug use, admittedly had some contact with unsavory 
195 See supra text accompanying note 95.
196 See Kats v.  Indiana, 559 N.E.2d 348 (Ct. Apps. Ind. 1990) (presenting similar 
facts).
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characters such as Rocky.  This much might be inferred from Ken’s 
approaching Rocky for a loan.   Even if Ken’s class is defined even 
more narrowly as “persons in financial need, short on prudence, and 
familiar with unsavory characters,” it is doubtful the police were 
operating according to a practice designed to entrap most of the 
members of this class.  Rather, they were only trying to entrap those 
who had the misfortune of approaching Rocky.  It no less offends 
justice to entrap only the members of the “class” that happen to know 
Rocky than it would be to impose a particularly high tax on those with 
high incomes who happened to know Rocky.  Thus, the prima facie 
validity of various law enforcement practices does not undermine the 
fairness principle as an explanation for the unjustness of entrapment.
D. Doctrinal Implications
A theory of entrapment should explain the major contours of the 
defense, such as the distinction between governmental and private 
entrapment.   The preceding sections have attempted to meet that goal.  
A theory of entrapment ideally should also be able to recommend 
solutions to open doctrinal issues.  That is the work of this section.
1. Subjective v. Objective Theories
An open issue in the area of entrapment is the dispute between the 
subjective and objective versions of the defense.  As argued earlier,
most cases actually brought will come out the same way under either 
version.197  For this reason, it was methodologically acceptable to 
formulate a theory of entrapment without reference to the distinction 
between the versions.  Nevertheless, having developed and defended 
the entrapment as unfairness theory, it is appropriate to inquire which 
version of the defense is more consistent with it.
The inquiry should focus on those rare cases where the subjective 
and objective versions produce different outcomes.  These may be 
referred to as cases of the objectively entrapped predisposed defendant.  
For example:
Larry is a professional pickpocket.  He owes 
$100 dollars to a bookie and must pay the debt 
the next day.  Broke, he leaves his home late one 
evening to go to a crowded bus terminal to ply 
his trade.  Larry has frequently been successful 
197 See section II.C. supra.
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at the terminal, but on a number of occasions, 
he has been arrested.  Just outside of the 
terminal, Larry sees a man lying on his side in a 
fetal position with a paper bag containing a 
beer bottle in one hand.  The man is a police 
officer feigning drunkenness as part of a decoy 
operation.  A wallet protrudes from the rear 
pocket of his jeans.  Bills sticking out of the 
wallet can be easily seen.  Larry walks by the 
apparently helpless drunkard.  He then turns 
back and steals the wallet.  Two officers 
witnessing the theft spring from cover and 
apprehend him.  Larry is charged with theft.
If these events occurred in a jurisdiction following the subjective 
version of the entrapment defense, Larry would be out of luck.  While 
he might be able to establish that he was induced to commit the theft, 
the government likely would be able to carry its burden of proving that 
Larry was predisposed.  Larry needs money immediately.  He has a 
criminal record of engaging in similar crimes at the same location.  
Larry did not hesitate in taking the wallet.  In contrast, if these events 
occurred in a jurisdiction following the objective version of the 
entrapment defense, Larry would likely be able to avoid conviction.  
Courts have held on similar facts that, as a matter of law, the drunk 
decoy operation created a substantial risk that theft would be 
committed by persons other than those ready to commit it, thereby 
satisfying the requirements of the objective test.198  On these facts, does 
the fairness principle permit conviction consistent with the objective 
version or require exoneration consistent with the subjective version?
Arguments based on the fairness principle may be advanced in 
support of either resolution.   On one hand, Larry can claim he has been 
treated unfairly because he has been subjected to an unfair police 
practice.  Using decoys is unfair because it typically results in the 
apprehension of an arbitrary member of a large, generally law-abiding 
class that the police have no wish or intent to prosecute generally.  On 
198 See Hawaii v.  Powell, 68 P.2d 266 (1986).  See also Cruz v.  Florida, 465 
So.2d 516 (1985) (use of drunk decoy satisfies objective test as matter of law); 
Sheriff, Washoe County v.  Hawkins, 752 P.2d 769 (Nevada 1988) (same).  But see
People v.  Walker, 615 P.2d 57 Colorado 1980) (rejecting entrapment defense on 
similar facts).
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the other hand, the government can argue that it is fair to convict Larry 
because it would, if it could, convict all similarly predisposed 
pickpockets.  The dilemma here is one manifestation of the general 
problem of how the law should treat parties, such as the police, that 
have acted in a manner that is objectionable in theory, but which, due to 
unforeseen circumstances, results in an otherwise acceptable outcome, 
such as the apprehension of a predisposed defendant.199
A reasonably close analogy is presented by “after-acquired 
evidence” cases that arise in the employment law context.  In the 
typical after-acquired evidence case, a member of a minority group is 
fired from a job and sues.  In the course of litigation, the plaintiff is 
able to establish that he was fired based on unlawful discriminatory 
grounds, but evidence is also discovered that shows that he committed 
predischarge conduct that would have justified his firing in the first 
place.  The minority member can claim he was subjected to an unfair 
practice (discriminatory discharge) and the employer can claim that the 
firing of an employee who engaged in misconduct is not unfair.  Courts 
have resolved after-acquired evidence cases, holding that the employer 
may proceed in the light of the newly acquired evidence to deny 
reinstatement and deny damages from the point where the evidence was 
acquired.200  Any other conclusion would be “inequitable.”201
There seems no reason why the dispute concerning the 
objectively entrapped predisposed defendants should be resolved 
differently than one concerning wayward employees who have suffered 
discrimination.  Applying this principle to entrapment, the predisposed 
defendant should be convicted despite the fact that he happened to be 
199 This also problem arises in the context of persons who engage in conduct 
prohibited according to an offense definition, unaware that they are doing so under 
circumstances that would uncontroversially establish a justification defense if they 
were aware of them.  Known as the problem of “unknowing justification,”this issue 
has attracted the attention of a number of criminal law theorists, including the Author.  
See e.g. Anthony M. Dillof, Unraveling Unknowing Justification, 77 Notre Dame L. 
Rev. 1547 (2002); Russell L. Christopher, Unknowing Justification and the Logical 
Necessity of the Dadson Principle in Self-Defense, 15 OXFORD J. LEG. STUDIES 228 
(1995); Paul Robinson, Competing Theories of Justification: Deeds v. Reasons, in 
HARM AND CULPABILITY 45 (A.P. Simester and A.T.H. Smith, 1996); Robert F. 
Schopp, Justification Defenses and Just Convictions, 24 PAC. L.J. 1233, 1267-82 
(1993).
200 See McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 362 (1995).
201 Id.
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ensnared in a practice which, as a general matter, produces unfair 
results.202    It is not unfair to convict persons like Larry because the 
government would, if it could, convict all the members of his class
(predisposed pickpockets).  The government, we might say, is not 
acting unfairly to him in prosecuting.  This point may be more clear if 
we imagine the less likely scenario that the government is aware that 
Larry is on his way to the bus terminal to pick a pocket, but for various 
reasons decides it would be preferable to catch Larry through the use of 
a decoy that  might ensnare even a generally law-abiding citizen.  Such 
a tactic, it is submitted, is not intuitively objectionable.
The case for the subjective version of entrapment, however, is not 
open and shut.  A prophylactic argument can be made for the objective 
version of the defense.  Under the subjective version, a defendant must 
be acquitted unless it can be demonstrated that he was predisposed.  It 
might be thought that juries will be overly eager to find predisposition 
in the face of actual criminal conduct and so fail to acquit a 
nonpredisposed person pursuant to the entrapment defense.  The 
objective version of the defense would eliminate such instances of 
erroneous conviction.  If the number of these erroneous convictions is 
expected to be greater than the relatively few number of cases where 
the objective and subjective versions diverge, these convictions can be 
eliminated at a relatively low cost.  The adoption of the objective 
version of entrapment, though overbroad, would then be defensible.
2. Positional Predisposition
A second doctrinal conflict lies within the ranks of adherents to 
the subjective version of entrapment.  Courts in subjective jurisdictions 
are split on the meaning of “predisposition.”  Generally speaking, under 
the subjective approach, where a defendant has been induced to commit 
a crime, he is entitled to an entrapment defense unless the government 
can establish that he was predisposed to commit the offense.  But 
202 Design aside, in cases of objectively entrapped predisposed defendants, the 
disproportionality of the burden is not as great as in the cases of nonpredisposed 
defendants.  First, there are many more nonpredisposed to crime than predisposed.  
Second, among this larger group, there are many fewer who potentially bear the 
burden of conviction.  Among the nonpredisposed, this lesser group is only those who 
have been exposed to usually high inducements.  In contrast, many of the predisposed 
will commit crimes and be apprehended, either as result of inducements not rising to 
entrapment or through the usual mechanism of police apprehension after commission 
of the crime.  Consequently, the relative percentage of nonpredisposed potentially 
burdened by entrapment is much less than that of the predisposed.
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exactly what is it to be predisposed?  The Ninth Circuit has concluded 
that a “predisposition” refers to a mental state or a characterological 
propensity, roughly equal to being ready and to commit the crime 
should an opportunity present itself.203  In contrast, the Seventh Circuit, 
in an opinion by Judge Posner, and the Fifth Circuit, have taken the 
position that “predisposition” includes a positional component.204
Under this interpretation of predisposition, a defendant would only be 
predisposed if, absent government involvement, he both was ready and 
willing to commit the crime (the mental component) and was so 
positioned that he would likely have committed it (the positional 
component).
An example offered by Judge Posner nicely illustrates the added 
requirement of the positional interpretation.  Posner writes:
Suppose the government went to someone and 
asked him whether he would like to make 
money as a counterfeiter, and the reply was, 
"Sure, but I don't know anything about 
counterfeiting." Suppose the government then 
bought him a printer, paper, and ink, showed 
him how to make the counterfeit money, hired 
a staff for him, and got everything set up so 
that all he had to do was press a button to print 
the money; and then offered him $10,000 for 
some quantity of counterfeit bills.205
The individual approached by the government clearly possessed the 
mental state sufficient to be found predisposed; when presented with 
the opportunity, he seized it with little prompting.  The individual,  
however, was not positionally predisposed because, absent the 
involvement of a government agent, it is doubtful he ever would have 
been in a position to move from his desire to counterfeit to actual 
counterfeiting.  In light of this fact, should the individual be considered 
“predisposed” for the purpose of the subjective version of the 
203 See United States v. Thicksun, 110 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997).
204 See United States v. Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d 1196 (7th Cir. 1994); U.S. v. 
Knox, 112 F.3d 802, 808 (5th Cir. 1997) (agreeing with Hollingsworth).
205 United States v. Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d 1196, 1199 (7th Cir. 1994).
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entrapment defense?  The Supreme Court has yet to address the 
issue.206
The fairness theory of entrapment would support the requirement 
of a positional component to predisposition.  It would thus favor 
extending the defense to those who would likely never have been in a 
position to have committed the charged offense absent the 
government’s providing that opportunity even if they were otherwise 
willing to commit the offense.  Under the fairness theory, willingness to 
commit an offense is not, in itself, a decisive factor permitting 
entrapment and conviction.  Many  “law-abiding” people, under the 
appropriate circumstances might be willing to commit a crime, 
particularly one without an identifiable victim.  It is fair to speculate 
that many people, for example, might trade on insider information if 
they believed the chances of detection were minimal and the financial 
gain realized, or loss to be avoided, was sizable.  For the government to 
arbitrarily select and entrap one among many such persons would be 
unfair.  Rather, under the fairness theory, the critical factor is the 
likelihood, all things considered, that the person would commit the 
offense.  If a person is likely to commit a crime, then entrapping and 
convicting those like him to protect the public is a course of action the 
government would like to engage in generally.  Although the 
government in fact may not be able to do so, this limitation no more 
renders the practice unacceptable than other social institutions which in 
206 In United States v. Jacobson, 503 U.S.540 (1992), the Court’s most recent 
entrapment case, the Court stated, “When the Government’s quest for conviction 
leads to the apprehension of an otherwise law-abiding citizen who, if left to his own 
devices, likely would never have run afoul of the law, the courts should intervene.”  
Id. at 553-54.  Literally construed, this statement is broad enough to admit a 
positional component.  The facts of Jacobson, however, do not require such an 
interpretation.  The court concluded that Jacobson was not predisposed.  There was no 
showing, however, that child pornography was otherwise unavailable over the 
Internet or otherwise.  Rather, the Court emphasized the government’s role in piquing 
and legitimating Jacobson’s interest in child pornography–implying that Jacobs 
lacked the mental component of predisposition.  Furthermore, language in older 
Supreme Court opinions stresses that the purpose of the entrapment defense is to 
protect the “unwary innocent.”  See United States v. Sorrells, 287 U.S. 435, 451 
(1932). This language is inconsistent with the positional interpretation.  It is difficult 
to describe persons who desire to commit crimes, such as the individual in Posner’s 
hypothetical, as innocent.
ANTHONY M. DILLOF 79
practice fail to consistently achieve the ideals they were designed to 
achieve.207
A similar analysis applies to the question whether a person should 
be considered predisposed if he has a substantial desire or inclination to 
engage in the criminal conduct at issue, but that desire or inclination is 
kept in check by a stronger appositional one.  For example, imagine 
Frank, a person who has always dreamed of being a counterfeiter, and 
has access to all the necessary equipment.  Frank, however, also has an 
overriding fear of being apprehended for counterfeiting.  Accordingly, 
Frank foregoes the opportunity to counterfeit until he is approached by 
undercover agents who convince him that he can proceed without 
detection.  Should we say that Frank was predisposed and thus not 
entitled to the entrapment defense?208  The fairness theory would reject 
this result.  From the perspective of fairness, Frank is in the same 
position as the individual in Posner, hypothetical.  While both have a 
desire to engage in crime, without government involvement it is 
unlikely that either would have.  The government is not interested in 
apprehending all of those held in check based on fear of apprehension 
or other defeasible psychological constraints on criminal desires.  Even 
though he has a desire to be a counterfeiter, it is unfair to make him the 
target of a practice that is designed to use the few for the benefit of the 
many.
Summary and Conclusion
The norms of justice constrain governmental efforts to advance 
the common good.  Retributive justice requires that an actor be morally 
culpable for causing or risking harm to another before the state may 
disadvantage the actor in a significant and stigmatizing way.  
Distributive justice requires that the benefit and burdens of the joint 
enterprise of society be appropriately shared among its members.  This 
Article has urged that the domains of these two sets of norms are not 
mutually exclusive, one beginning where the other leaves off.  Rather 
they may overlap in various contexts, operating in a simultaneous and 
complementary fashion to restrain the state.
207 See text accompany note 193 supra.
208 This issue is raised in Jacobson v. United States, where the dissent argued that 
the Court’s finding that Jacobson had a predisposition to view photographs of preteen 
sex should, without more, defeat Jacobson’s entrapment claim.  Id. at 559.
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Case in point is entrapment.  In order to justly punish persons 
who have been entrapped, it must be that they are culpable for their 
unlawful acts.  This Article has argued that they are, even in cases 
where they have faced temptations that even a reasonable person might 
yield to.  There is no excuse for freely choosing to do wrong.  Even 
though reasonable persons cannot be blamed for their limited resistance 
to temptation, they can be blamed when those limits are exceeded and 
wrongdoing results.  Rather than foundering on norms of retributive 
justice, entrapment founders on the norms of distributive justice.  Most 
persons entrapped within the legal definition of entrapment are 
nonpredisposed to crime, and so are not dangerous enough to justify 
entrapping pursuant to a general practice.  From a utilitarian 
perspective, entrapment is justified not because it incapacitates, but 
because it can deter generally.  Deterrence however is inherently a 
matter of using few for the benefit of the many who might otherwise be 
victims of crimes or subjects of criminal sanctions.  Entrapping the 
many would make no sense.  Thus, entrapment, as a practice, is 
designed to disadvantage only a limited number of the population who 
are similarly situated with respect to dangerousness, deterrent value, 
and other relevant features.  In this respect, entrapment is similar to the 
conversion of an arbitrarily selected person’s home to a police station 
for the benefit of the community as a whole.  The goal of crime 
prevention is advanced, but the cost is not properly shared over the 
relevant class.  This is unfair to the person entrapped.  The defense of 
entrapment exists to prevent exactly such unfairness.
Conceiving of the entrapment defense as a response to the 
problem of unfairness unravels one of the core puzzles of the 
entrapment defense: why it is limited to cases where a government 
agent, rather than a private party, encourages the defendant.  A person 
is neither more responsible nor more dangerous if, unbeknownst to 
him, his tempter worked for the government.  Indeed, the deterrent 
effect of convicting a person entrapped by the government might be 
greater than if inducer were a private party.  Convicting a person 
governmentally entrapped demonstrates the state’s commitment to 
aggressively rooting out potential criminals and punishing the culpable.  
Nor does government entrapment present a significant threat to civil 
rights.  A government intent on suppressing dissent has many more 
practical means than entrapment, and the defense of entrapment is not 
the only means to avoid conviction in such cases.  The key to the 
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governmental/private inducer distinction is the agent-relative nature of 
the fairness principle.  Fairness bars the state from arbitrarily selecting 
a class member for burdening, while the state may impose burdens 
based on the arbitrary selection of a class member by others.  In this 
respect, fairness is like other principles of justice, such as corrective 
justice, which requires the correcting of only the wrongs imposed by 
the agent, while allowing wrongs imposed by others to be disregarded.
Explicating the entrapment defense in terms of unfairness 
suggests directions for the entrapment doctrine to develop.  However, 
regardless whether these suggestions are adopted, bringing to bear 
considerations of moral and political philosophy, as well as insights 
and analogies from other areas of law, serves to better mark the 
defense’s present position and to illuminate its future path.  If criminal 
law does not look outward, beyond its scholastic boundaries, if it does 
not look deeper, beneath its case law articulation, then criminal law is 
fated to become entrapped in its own doctrinal mazes.
